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This paper examines the need for a UAV Swarm Risk Assessment Tool and how it can 
assist the Navy’s decision makers in assessing risk of UAV swarm threats in littoral 
environments, near potentially hostile countries, based on the latest intelligence.  
Human-centered design principles help determine the needs of experienced battle 
commanders. These needs form the basis of requirements and functional analysis. The 
system design concept consists of several parts: discrete-event simulation of UAV swarm 
attacks using ExtendSim, statistical analysis of the simulation data using Minitab, and a 
graphical user interface (GUI) that evolved as a web-app prototype written in MATLAB.  
Data from the simulation is analyzed and used to generate equations that calculate 
the effect of critical factors: physical environment, number of UAVs, distance from land, 
and the ship’s defensive weapons. The GUI uses these equations to provide users with the 
capability to vary those critical factors and analyze different courses of action and risk. 
The physical GUI web-app can be used as-is, tailored or expanded. The paper concludes 
with an analysis of the actual GUI prototype built for UAV swarm risk assessment and 
how it meets user needs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Many of the United States Navy’s operational areas of responsibility are located in 
littoral environments near countries hostile to the United States. These operational areas 
consist of physically constrained environments that limit surface ship maneuverability. 
These areas have a higher likelihood of an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) swarm attack 
than typical blue water operations because of the ship’s close proximity to land. Also, 
most countries now possess the technology to produce mass quantities of UAVs that can 
be weaponized.  
UAV threats are unlike traditional air threats such as manned aircraft and cruise 
missiles. UAVs have flight envelopes that make them challenging to defeat. The littoral 
environment makes it difficult to detect and identify UAVs in such a cluttered 
environment. Warfighters will be challenged to make time-critical decisions, possibly 
with insufficient threat information, while determining an appropriate response. 
This report identifies a gap in the ability to assess the risk of these swarm attacks 
from the operational, tactical and planning level. Current commanders have to take the 
intelligence provided to make an assessment without tangible data outputs. The intent of 
this paper is to build and examine a tool that will bridge the gap between intelligence and 
tangible outputs in order to assist decision makers in assessing risk. This software tool 
will primarily be used by surface ship commanding officers, carrier task force 
commanders, fleet commanders, operational planning teams, or area of responsibility 
commanders to conduct UAV swarm attack risk assessments based on real-time 
intelligence. The system was designed to assess the interactions of controllable and 
uncontrollable factors of a UAV swarm attacks. Key attributes include: 
1. Providing the stakeholders a way to rapidly assess risk of a potential UAV 
swarm attack 
2. Allowing criterion to be manually entered for automatic outputs 
3. Providing a visual representation of the outputs in terms of reaction time 
and probability of attack outcome 
 xvi 
4. Providing a rapid risk assessment based on available data to provide an 
analysis traceable to a high fidelity model 
The primary output of this project was an interactive operational risk assessment 
system that included a graphical user interface (GUI). This GUI is a preliminary design 
prototype. This paper examines the development of a system using the human-centered 
design process. This process relied heavily on the definition of user needs of surface ship 
commanding officers, task force commanders and planning team members. These user 
needs were determined using interviews of the stakeholders. The operational context was 
developed using a combination of user needs and literature research. Needs and 
operational context were examined in order to determine the high-level system 
requirements of both the GUI and simulation. The users primarily needed a tool with 
visual representation of the outcome of a swarm attack. The user wanted to be able to 
enter UAV type and location, as well as their own ship’s defense capabilities. The output 
had to be unambiguous, and it had to provide distance and time from threat. This allows 
the decision maker to determine the ship route of travel during planning to reduce the risk 
and understand the time to react after initial detection. 
This paper presents a high-level system design that is used to understand the 
subsystem interactions required for the implementation of a working prototype. The 
system components include a high-fidelity discrete-event simulation of a UAV swarm 
attack on a ship, a statistical analysis of the discrete-event simulation outputs, and a 
computer-based GUI. Given the complexity of the discrete-event simulation and the 
statistical analysis of its outputs, it was determined that the GUI should be a standalone 
subsystem that utilizes response equations based on the simulation output rather than 
including the simulation itself to produce outputs that fulfill user requirements. The 
response equations were written in MATLAB GUI based on the statistical analysis of the 
discrete-event simulation outputs and included in the GUI software code to enable 
immediate responses. By making the discrete-event simulation and the statistical analysis 
separate from the GUI, task-specific commercial software could be used to perform the 
required work. 
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Using the high-level system design and user defined requirements, a functional 
analysis of the system was preformed to ensure that all defined and derived requirements 
were met. System architecture was presented based on this functional analysis. The 
functional analysis was performed using a top-down method of all required functions and 
their interactions. 
This paper presents the simulation that addresses the interaction of factors 
relevant to UAV swarm attacks. Using ExtendSim 9, the authors created a discrete-event 
simulation of a basic UAV swarm attack on a U.S. Navy surface ship. The simulation 
allowed the authors to explore and analyze the trade-space in order to identify those input 
factors that would have the greatest effect on the scenario outcome. Controls for those 
factors were then featured prominently in the GUI design. 
Minitab 17 was used to analyze the simulation output (step one) and to fit a 
regression equation (step two) representing the relationships between factors. This 
equation was used in the MATLAB GUI code (step three) to enable immediate responses 
to user inputs, without the need to re-run the simulation after each change. The primary 
factors that affect ship success during a UAV swarm attack were distance, number of 
UAVs, UAV speed, and environmental factors. Ultimately, these three steps enabled the 
authors to create a prototype that was complete, realistic and adaptable using the data 
available and making the tool manageable for future improvements by employing 
Minitab17 and MATLAB GUI. 
This paper presents the development of multiple low fidelity prototypes. These 
prototypes were designed based on user needs and simulation results. The GUI gives the 
user a visual representation of the UAV swarm attack risk under various conditions and 
lets users explore the trade space for risk using a number of inputs. This paper examines a 
series of prototypes with increased fidelity designed in MATLAB GUI emulating a web-
based application. The prototype was updated to a final iteration using stakeholder 
feedback after testing. The final GUI presents two visual representations: absolute 
position, drawn on a map, and relative position, indicated by range rings around the ship. 
Heat maps and contour lines visually represent the level of threat to the ship and the 
available time to react based on distance detected. 
 xviii 
Following the design of the prototype, a cost estimate was presented for the risk 
assessment system using System Cost Model Suite provided by the Naval Postgraduate 
School. The System Cost Model Suite performed estimates for various engineering 
disciplines including system engineering and software development. Total cost for a fleet 
development would be in excess of $1.74M. 
This report concludes with an examination of the recommendations for future 
designs based on user feedback. Future applications would need to be web-based in order 
to remove the responsibility of updating the application from the user. Nonkinetic 
weapons will be a consideration for UAV attack response in the future and will require 
the GUI to have inputs for enhanced capabilities. Kill radius will need to become a 




Chapter I include background information to allow the reader to get familiar with 
the topics to be discussed. The problem statement, goal and objectives are discussed. In 
addition, the system engineering model approached used in this project is explained in 
detail. 
A. BACKGROUND 
With the increased investment in unmanned system development in countries 
hostile to the United States, the likelihood of an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) swarm 
attack on a U.S. flagged warship is becoming a reality. The operational areas that the risk 
is highest are in narrow passages that require either limited ship maneuverability with 
territorial waters on each side or a physically constrained operating environment. Despite 
the dangers of operating in these constrained littoral environments, these areas of the 
world are and will continue to be major shipping lanes for worldwide commerce, thus 
requiring a military presence (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014). 
UAVs are unlike other air threats to a surface ship. When compared to traditional 
air threats, both manned aircraft and cruise missiles, UAVs have characteristics that make 
them challenging to defeat. In general, UAVs fly at slower speeds than traditional air 
threats and have relatively smaller radar cross-sections (Davis et al. 2014). Given that 
many modern, deployed air defense radar systems were not designed to detect threats 
with such characteristics, UAVs remain a formidable foe (Button et al. 2008). 
The littoral environment adds an additional layer to the current detection problem 
given the possibility for radar terrain masking until a low-altitude air threat has 
transitioned to the water environment. Even when the threat transition to water, “sea 
surface can limit the observation of low-altitude targets by surface or low altitude radars” 
(Curry 2011). Radar terrain masking refers to the radar horizon range were the line-of-
sight (LOS) of the radar is blocked by terrain or limited by sea surface (Curry 2011). The 
observation of low-altitude targets by surface or low-altitude radars can be masked by the 
terrain or be limited by the sea surface (Curry 2011). When taken as a whole, these 
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characteristics provide UAVs with a distinct advantage over war ships that need to 
establish robust procedures in order to protect against their inherent vulnerability in these 
operating conditions. 
Even when they are detected, clear monitoring is required to track and identify the 
possible intentions of inbound UAVs. And when a target is identified, enough data may 
not be available given current shipboard systems to estimate the size or payload of the 
threat (Button et al. 2008). As such, battle commanders could find themselves in a time-
critical situation where insufficient information exists to determine an appropriate 
response. 
In addition to the detection and identification difficulties that UAVs pose, they 
also have potential strength in numbers. Given their relatively low construction and 
operating cost when compared to traditional air threats, countries can target ships using a 
large number of UAVs. Since many of the current attack UAVs are meant to self-
detonate, they are designed as an unrecoverable asset (Davis et al. 2014). When 
compared to traditional air threats, UAVs also carry significantly smaller payloads that 
not only make attacking in large numbers a strategic advantage, but also a necessity 
(Button et al. 2008). These increases in potential UAVs make the detection and 
identification of such attacks that much more difficult in terms of time-critical decisions 
for battle commanders. 
Examination of the effectiveness of the ships in these attacks can be broken down 
into four categories: detection and tracking, identification, kill chain response time, and 
weapons engagement (kinetic and nonkinetic). This research was in support of creating a 
simulation that examines the relationship between the primary factors affecting the 
effectiveness against an unmanned swarm. It was envisioned that a high-fidelity 
simulation model could be used to create outputs of UAV swarm scenarios. These 
outputs would then be used to design a preliminary operational risk management system 
that determines a risk output file. The risk would be displayed with all the pertinent 
information that the battle commanders need in order to make the time-critical decisions 
required during such an attack. 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A UAV swarm attack risk assessment tool is not currently available for surface 
ship commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet commanders, operational 
planning teams or area of responsibility commanders. Current commanders have to take 
the intelligence provided to make an assessment without tangible data outputs. That is to 
say, intelligence exists about the potential for specific UAV threats, however, there is no 
appreciable information provided to make decisions if an attack actually occurs. The 
determination of possible engagement timelines and outcomes is information that battle 
commanders do not currently receive prior to littoral operations. 
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The authors’ intent is to provide a new tool that will provide tangible data outputs 
that will assess the risk for an operation. This tool will solve the problem at hand by 
providing the decision makers a way to quantitatively predict risk to operations via a 
user-friendly output. 
The goal of this project was to develop a system that includes a software tool for 
use by surface ship commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet 
commanders, operational planning teams or area of responsibility commanders to 
conduct UAV swarm attack risk assessments. The system was designed to collect 
information about the systems and interactions involved in UAV swarm attacks. 
Key attributes of the system are: 
1. Provide the stakeholders a way to rapidly assess risk of a potential UAV 
swarm attack. 
2. Allow for the manual entry of criterion that produce automatic outputs. 
3. Provide a visual representation of the outputs in terms of reaction time and 
probability of attack outcome. 
4. Provide a rapid risk assessment based on available data to provide an 
analysis traceable to a high fidelity model. 
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The preliminary system was developed in order to inform strategic and tactical 
commanders about the risk of UAV swarm attacks in constrained areas. This system is 
intended to enable leaders to make a more informed decision on whether or not to accept 
the risk of encountering a UAV swarm attack with the information provided by the tool. 
The tool allows the stakeholders to have data-driven results that take into account current 
intelligence and presents the user with a preliminary operational risk assessment. This 
system is not intended to be a complete solution for all possible situations; however, this 
system is designed to provide users the means to make educated decisions if a UAV 
attack is encountered. 
The system displays risk with all the pertinent information that the stakeholder 
needs in order to make a relevant decisions to accept risk or to take action in considering 
other relevant alternatives that may be available. The tool allows the stakeholders to 
propose new measures of operation based on the risk assessment given by the tool and 
have data to support changes in the operations or improvements necessary to reduce the 
risk of a UAV swarm attack in constrained environments. 
The primary output of this project was an interactive operational risk assessment 
system that includes a graphical user interface (GUI). This GUI is a preliminary design 
prototype. In order to design the GUI, a modeling and simulation tool was developed to 
provide outputs to the GUI. The GUI then calculates the risk assessment outputs required 
by the battle commanders using the modeling and simulation data outputs. As such, an in-
depth study was required to ensure that the problem space was accurately depicted and 
that appropriate data was generated. The proposed study was intended to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. What are the types, capabilities, and flight envelopes for unmanned aerial 
“attack” vehicles of hostile foreign countries? 
2. What tangible information, systems, and interactions are needed by surface 
ship commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet 
commanders, operational planning teams or area of responsibility 
commanders to make a risk decision for an operation? 
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3. What are the standard and nonstandard navy tactics for UAV swarm 
attack? 
4. What are the gaps in technology and processes for UAV swarm response 
and what are the current work-arounds being used by the fleet? 
D. SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESS 
This project involved the development of a UAV Swarm Operations Risk 
Management Software system GUI. The authors held discussions with surface warfare 
commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet commanders, operational 
planning teams and area of responsibility commanders. The primary goal of these 
discussions was to identify the needs of the battle commanders and utilize their 
professional inputs to refine the requirements of the system. Following the initial 
refinement of requirements, the authors developed the modeling and simulation tool and 
GUI prototype. After initial GUI development, the authors demonstrated the GUI and 
collected subject matter expert (SME) feedback and input for iterative upgrades.  
The system engineering process model approach used is a tailored version of the 
V-Model. A pictorial representation of the Capstone System Engineering (SE) model 
with each phase deliverables is shown in Figure 1. 
 6 
 
Figure 1. Tailored Capstone System Engineering Process 
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Elements one through nine define each SE phase and deliverables. 
1. Initial Problem Space Exploration: Phase One consists of a threat analysis 
and existing gap analysis to explore the problem space. This phase 
included in-depth topic research along with an initial stakeholder analysis. 
The goal was to identify the stakeholders, engage them in collaborative 
discussions to identify their needs and use their professional inputs to 
refine the requirements for the system. The phase output provided the 
authors with a solid understanding of stakeholders’ perspective on gaps, 
roles, responsibilities and expectations.  
2. High Concept Definition: Phase Two focused on the human user. The 
focus was to use early low-fidelity prototypes based on the research to 
discover and validate concepts, and user needs. The high concept design 
will be based on “what if?” scenario that will act as a catalyst for the UAV 
swarm events in the GUI prototype risk management tool. Key risks were 
identified. Alternative concepts for meeting the project purpose and needs 
were explored. The exact nature of the anticipated functioning prototype 
risk management tool was identified based on the stakeholders’ needs and 
documented research. Additionally, the authors verified project feasibility, 
project scope and identified preliminary risks. By this stage the goal was 
to have the exact nature of the project goals and objectives, purpose and 
need, scope and initial high level architecture defined. 
3. Concept of Operations: Phase Three documented the concept of operations 
(CONOPS) as a foundation for more in-depth analysis. The authors 
identified high level user needs and systems capabilities in terms that all 
stakeholders can understand. The authors also identified the: who, what, 
why, where, and, how of the system GUI. The focus was to engage 
stakeholders in collaborative discussions to define and create the initial 
CONOPS, review with stakeholders and iterate. The primary output was a 
CONOPS describing who, what, why, where, and, how of the project 
including stakeholders needs, constraints and identified risks. The authors 
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also had a system verification plan defining the approach that was used to 
verify the functioning prototype risk management tool GUI.  
4. System Requirements: During Phase Four, the authors developed a 
validated set of system requirements that meet the stakeholder needs based 
on the CONOPS. The authors elicited requirements that were analyzed, 
documented, validated and managed according to the stakeholders needs. 
5. Project Design: During Phase Five, the authors focused on the project 
design using simulation capabilities based on the system requirements. 
The requirements were allocated to the system components and interfaces 
specified. This phase produced a high-level architecture design with detail 
design specifications. 
6. Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Data: Phase Six focused on the M&S data 
that was used in the simulation. The simulation provided the input data 
that was used in the GUI for verification, test and evaluation. 
7. System Development and Testing: Phase Seven focused on the 
development of a GUI. This was a preliminary design prototype. The 
solution was modified as needed to meet the design specifications. The 
output in this phase was a GUI model that was tested in iterative phases 
for verification and acceptance. 
8. Model Verification: Phase Eight verified the system model in accordance 
with the high level design, requirements, verification plans and 
procedures.  
9. Delivery: Phase Nine focused on the delivery of the interactive operational 
risk assessment system preliminary design prototype GUI. The GUI was 
delivered to the stakeholders. The project final deliverables were arranged 
accordingly and delivered by the set due dates. This included the tool, 




II. PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION 
In Chapter II, the authors begin with an explanation of the system operational 
concept diagram. Then the threat analysis was broken down to three UAVs of interest. 
Current Navy surface ships counter UAV capabilities were identified. Tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP) with existing UAV simulations and related tools were 
explored. Chapter II ends with a concept description and the path used for the 
development of this project. 
As shown in Figure 2, system development was a multi-pronged effort that 
encompassed multiple areas of concern with respect to the problem space. The authors 
started with a literature research that included but was not limited to: DOD intelligence 
reports, UAV threat assessment, U.S. weapons systems and mission planning. 
Throughout the report there is reference to a modeling and simulation portion. The 
modeling and simulation was used to create the background information in order to 
generate the data, evaluate the threats and create a data set to be provided as an input in 
the GUI. The modeling and simulation is not the focus of this report, but it was an 
integral part of the GUI development. Therefore, significant rigor was required to ensure 
that all possible factors and their interactions were captured in the development, 




Figure 2. System Operational Concept Diagram 
 
A. THREAT ANALYSIS 
Recent developments in precision navigation, satellite communication, and 
lightweight materials have paved the path for the widespread development and 
attractiveness of armed UAVs (Davis et al. 2014). Although manufacturers in the U.S. 
and Israel dominate the global UAV market (approximately 75 percent share between 
them), the availability of commercial of the shelf (COTS) technology has provided a host 
of other countries with the means to develop, test, and field UAV technology of their own 
(Jane’s Information Group 2014d). The primary focus of the most recent UAV 
development has been in support of medium altitude long endurance (MALE) platforms 
(Jane’s Information Group 2014d). Nations such as Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the 
United Arab Emirates are all actively engaged in the development of their own MALE 
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UAVs (Jane’s Information Group 2014d). Although, the LOS two-way communication 
range usually limits the operating range of MALE platforms, many of these platforms can 
be used for one-way fully autonomous strike missions (Davis et al. 2014). In addition to 
using MALE UAVs as a strike platform, nonrecoverable, strike-specific UAVs have also 
been developed and widely proliferated. Research has shown that the UAV inventories of 
many of the countries hostile to the U.S. contain a combination of MALE and 
nonrecoverable strike-specific UAVs. Therefore, for the purpose of this system 
development, it was determined that these two types of UAVs comprise the most realistic 
threat to U.S. flagged warships operating in the littoral environment. 
There are several key characteristics of UAVs that make them a credible threat to 
warships in the littoral environment. These characteristics include, but are not limited to: 
1. Strength in numbers 
2. Difficult to detect and differentiate 
3. Relatively low cost 
4. Mobile launch sites 
5. Fire and forget capability 
6. Technology is accessible 
UAVs are difficult to detect given their relatively slow speed and small radar 
cross section, especially in a cluttered overland environment. Furthermore, a singular 
UAV is even harder to differentiate in an attacking group of multiple UAVs. UAVs are 
also significantly cheaper than the high value units that they are designed to attack. 
Mobile launch sites allow for the rapid deployment of UAVs in remote areas during an 
attack and make it very difficult to track and gain detailed intelligence on UAV threats. 
Fire and forget capability can be used via preprogrammed points for an attack; a UAV(s) 
can be launched without continuous monitoring. 
The following UAVs were used for the purpose of this system development 
project. This project is limited to examining only three UAVs due to the scope of the 
project and the schedule constraints associated with the academic timeline. These three 
UAVs were chosen based upon their capabilities and the countries that operate them. 
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1. Yasir 
Pictures and Iranian media reports indicate that the Yasir, shown in Figure 3, was 
developed by reverse-engineering a Boeing-Insitu Scan Eagle UAV obtained by the 
Iranian government (Jennings 2013). Assuming performance capabilities similar to the 
Scan Eagle, the Yasir has a 10-foot 2.5-inch wingspan with an operational payload plus 
fuel of 16 pounds. The Yasir is launched using a portable, pneumatic launcher with a 
propulsion system comprised of a single piston engine that is capable of a maximum level 
speed of 80 knots (92 miles per hour) (Jane’s Information Group 2015b). According to 
Iranian defense authorities, the Yaris has a ceiling of 15,000 feet and operational range of 
108 nautical miles (nm) (124 miles) (Jennings 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. Iranian Yasir UAV (from Cenciotti 2013)  
2. Ababil-T 
The Ababil-T, shown in Figure 4, is the short to medium range attack variant of 
the Iranian-built Ababil UAV. It is a twin-tailed, swept wing design capable of carrying a 
payload of 100 pounds of high explosive warhead and is launched from a portable, 
pneumatic launcher. The Abibal-T propulsion system consists of a single two-stroke 
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piston engine that drives two pusher propellers and is capable of 200 knots (230 miles per 
hour) at a ceiling of 10,820 feet and operational range of 27 nm (31 miles). The Ababil-T 
is highly dependent upon LOS communication; however, it is capable of global 
positioning system (GPS) navigation for striking both fixed and moving targets (Jane’s 
Information Group 2014a). 
 
 
Figure 4. Iranian Ababil-T UAV (from Jane’s Information Group 2014a)  
3. Harpy 
The Harpy, shown in Figure 5, is an Israeli-built strike-specific UAV. It has mid-
mounted delta wings with full span elevons capable of carrying a payload of 70 pounds. 
The Harpy is launched by booster rocket from a ground or truck-mounted 18-round 
container. The propulsion system consists of a single two-stroke piston engine that drives 
two-blade pusher propeller and is capable of 135 knots (155 miles per hour) at a ceiling 
of 9,840 feet with an operational range of 270 nm (311 miles). The Harpy is fully 
autonomous and flies a preprogrammed flight profile until its radar acquires a target. 
Once commit altitude is reached, side force panels are deployed to stabilize the UAV 
during a terminal dive. In other words, this type of UAV could be used as a one-way or 
kamikaze style attack where the UAV dives into a target and explodes with no intent of 
returning to base (Jane’s Information Group 2013b). 
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Figure 5. Israeli Harpy UAV (from Jane’s Information Group 2013b) 
For comparison purposes, UAV specifications are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Threat UAV Specifications (after Jennings 2013; Jane’s Information 












16(1) 80 15,000 108 
Portable, pneumatic 
launcher with a 
propulsion system 
comprised of a single 
piston engine Iran 
Ababil-T 
100 200 10,820 27 
Runway using its single 
two-stroke piston engine 
that drives two pusher 
propellers Iran 
Harpy 
70 135 9,840 270 
Booster rocket from a 







Notes:  (1) Yasir UAV payload of 16 lb does not include fuel load; therefore, available payload is 
impacted by the amount of fuel required for the mission. 
 (2) MSL=Mean Sea Level 
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B. CURRENT NAVY SURFACE SHIP COUNTER UAV CAPABILITIES 
In order to explore the problem space for weapons engagement against UAVs, the 
type of platform that they would be attacking had to be assessed. The idea behind the 
project was to work with U.S. ships that were in constrained environments. The type of 
ships that were evaluated needed to be able to conduct operations as either an individual 
ship or as part of a larger fighting group. 
Based on the identification of U.S. ships able to work in constrained 
environments, it led to the selection of the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers and the 
Ticonderoga Class Cruiser. The project effort concentrates on the evaluation of these two 
classes of ships. They conduct missions as both a single ship and as part of larger task 
forces or strike groups. Both of these ships have numerous detection and engagement 
systems that could be used to counter UAV attacks. The different ship capabilities can be 
seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Ship Type for Model Development (after Jane’s Information Group 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c) 
 
Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyer Ticonderoga Class Cruiser 
Specifications 
509 ft 567 ft 
31 kts (4300 nm range) 30 kts (6000 nm range) 
278-282 Crewmembers 330 Crewmembers 




1 Mk45- 5in Gun 2 Mk45- 5in Gun 
1-2 Mk15 CIWS 2 Mk15 CIWS 
Mk38 Machine Gun System Mk38 Machine Gun System 
Standard Missile (Out of 
Scope) 
Standard Missile (Out of 
Scope) 
 
Both ships are comparable in size, manpower, armament, and speed. They also 
look similar to the enemy as seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Their weapons engagement 
capabilities are the primary reason that the ship classes were selected. The five-inch gun, 
close-in weapons system (CIWS), and the machine gun system (MGS) have been tested 
against unmanned systems (Jane’s Information Group, 2014b). The effectiveness of these 
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weapon systems against unmanned threats is at a classification level outside the scope of 
this project. The data used for modeling and simulation was based on generalities 
acquired through open source documentation. A detail discussion on how the two classes 
of ships were modeled based on unclassified weapons engagements effectiveness is 
located in the modeling and simulation chapter of this report. 
 
Figure 6. Ticonderoga Class Cruiser (from Jane’s Information Group 2015c) 
 
Figure 7. Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (from Jane’s Information Group 
2015a) 
The kinetic weapons were assessed at a completely unclassified level. Information 
on their effectiveness was acquired from unclassified and open source material. The 
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capabilities of the five-inch gun, CIWS, and MGS are presented in Table 3. Currently 
there is no unclassified source that speaks to the probability of kill for each system 
against a UAV. 
Table 3. Counter UAV Weapons (after Jane’s Information Group 
2013a, 2014b, 2014c) 
 




Designator Mk 45 Mk 15 Mk 38 
Caliber 127mm 22mm 25mm 
Muzzle 
Velocity 808 m/s 1,030 m/s 1,100 m/s 






Range 23 km 1.47 km 2.47 km 
 
Images of the weapons seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9 give an idea of the size and 
magnitude of the systems being used to engage a UAV. Even as large as these systems 
appear to be, they are fairly agile and quick to react. CIWS is actually designed to defend 
against aerial attacks and missiles. Both the CIWS and MGS have very high rates of fire, 
but they lack the lethal range of the five-inch gun. CIWS and MGS would not be 
available to engage until the attacking UAV is very close to the ship. This limits the 
engagement capabilities against multiple UAVs because the CIWS and MGS will not be 
able to engage at the maximum range of UAV detection. The five-inch gun has a large 
effective range but lacks a high rate of fire. With the rate of fire less than one shot every 
three seconds, it will take longer for each UAV to be engaged. 
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Figure 8. Mk 15-Close-In Weapons System (from Jane’s Information Group, 
2014b) 
 
Figure 9. Mk 45-5in Gun (from Jane’s Information Group, 2013a) 
Along with educated assumptions, probability of kill was based on the UAV 
envelope, UAV radar cross-section, sea state and other environmental factors. An in-
depth assessment to study the actual effects on probability of detection and kill based on 
the environment and UAV parameters was outside the scope of this report. Information to 
their relevance is available but at higher classification level than available in this 
document. This project provides the building blocks to analyze intelligence data to 
evaluate the UAV swarm attacks. 
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In addition, research into nonkinetic engagement systems was limited based on 
the scope of the project. It was decided to concentrate on kinetic systems only because of 
scope limitations. It is recommended as an area for further study to include nonkinetic 
systems in the Risk Assessment System. 
C. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, PROCEDURES 
A U.S. Navy surface ship sailing into a constrained environment such as a straits 
transit presents several well documented challenges. Challenges include restricted 
maneuvering, a potential for high air and surface traffic to include civilian, commercial 
and military all within close proximity of each other as shown in Figure 10. During a 
straits transit a surface ship or any ship for that matter, is required to obey the Law of the 
Sea. The Law of the Sea applied to warships and military aircraft mandates that: 
Ships and aircraft must avoid “any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the State 
bordering the strait” (Alexander 1991, 92) 
 
Figure 10. Straits Transit UAV Swarm Attack Scenario 
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In addition to avoiding the appearance of being threatening through the use of 
force in a strait transit scenario, the Law of the Sea also requires that ships move 
expeditiously through the strait. It has and will continue to be the policy of the U.S.: 
That warships, operating in their normal mode through international straits 
overlapped by territorial seas, may undergo formation steaming, and 
launch and recover aircraft. (Alexander 1991, 92) 
The tactics employed by U.S. Navy surface ships during a straits transit scenario 
include having one or two helicopters airborne, typically MH-60S or MH-60R. The 
helicopters are not allowed to go over land and are not allowed to violate the airspace of 
the countries that boarder the strait. The rules of engagement (ROE) also are another 
driver of tactics. For instance, consider a single ship; a typical ROE when it has been 
fired upon or is under attack is that the crew has the right to defend itself with the 
proportional amount of force, or to maneuver out of the area. A typical ROE for a ship 
according to ship commanders interviewed is to not engage a UAV if the UAV is 
observing or capturing data of the ship at a distance. 
The tactics for a surface ship to defend against a swarm of UAVs in a constrained 
environment is a tough challenge to solve as UAV technology is always evolving. An 
example of an evolving drone technology that is being done by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the development of a neuromorphic chip that is 
designed to be capable of learning like a human (Reagan 2014). According to MIT 
Technology Review during a simple three-room test for the drone host that had the chip 
installed:  
The first time the drone was flown into each room, the unique pattern of 
incoming sensor data from the walls, furniture, and other objects caused a 
pattern of electrical activity in the neurons that the chip had never 
experienced before. That triggered it to report that it was in a new space, 
and also caused the ways its neurons connected to one another to change, 
in a crude mimic of learning in a real brain. Those changes meant that next 
time the craft entered the same room, it recognized it and signaled as such. 
(Simonite 2014) 
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If this type of technology is able to be matured to the point where UAVs can 
operate autonomously, learn and adjust to Navy tactics while enroute, and in a networked 
fashion, then that ability poses a potentially significant threat to the ship. 
Formally adopted Navy TTPs for responding to UAV swarm style of attacks 
against a ship operating in a constrained environment, such as a straits transit scenario, 
have not yet been promulgated. Additionally, once tactics are established, they will need 
to change to meet the ever evolving threat posed by advances in UAV technology. 
D. EXISTING UAV SIMULATIONS AND RELATED TOOLS 
The authors surveyed available references covering the current capabilities 
relevant to the project. These fall into two categories: UAV swarm attack simulations and 
operational planning user tools. There are many existing UAV swarm attack simulations 
whose results have been captured in reports and theses. These results, along with 
available model implementation insight, guided the development of the modeling and 
simulation input data to create the simulation and GUI. The simulation was used to guide 
the development of the prototype user interface. 
Two UAV defense simulations were applicable to this project. These were 
documented in the theses “Adaptive Discrete Event Simulation for Analysis of Harpy 
Swarm Attack” (Cobb 2011) and “UAV Swarm Attack: Protection System Alternatives 
for Destroyers” (Pham et al. 2012). 
Cobb (2011) developed a Java-based discrete-event simulation for the evaluation 
of the sensitivity of impact rate of Harpy-like UAVs on a ship to UAV and ship 
characteristics. The Harpy UAVs were modeled as loitering overhead searching for radar 
signals to lock on to. Modeling of the ship’s defenses was limited to a static probability 
of impact for each UAV. In all simulation runs, 54 UAVs were loitering in the ship’s 
path. Cobb’s analysis indicated that the probability of each UAV detecting the ship and 
ship speed significantly affected the UAV impact rate by changing how many UAVs 
pursued the ship — meaning a “big” UAV swarm has a higher probability of detection 
(2011). A faster ship will have lower probability of response time available. Also 
significant was the UAV dive speed, though it was shown not to strongly interact with 
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other parameters. The limited simulation of ship defenses and the lack of variation in the 
number of UAVs present made this model and results unsuitable for the development of 
the application. 
Pham et al. (2012) used a model developed in Microsoft Excel to explore the 
sensitivity analysis of UAV impact rate on a guided missile destroyer (DDG) to detailed 
UAV and ship characteristics. In Pham et al. (2012), the approaching UAVs were a mix 
of remote controlled and fully autonomous types. The UAV and ship characteristics were 
selected based on publicly available specifications on known UAV and ship 
configurations. Pham et al. (2012) provided guidance on the information flow through a 
DDG following threat detection that is useful in the accurate modeling of delay between 
detection and engagement. According to Pham et al. (2012), the number of CIWS 
systems aboard the DDG affects the impact rate more strongly than any of the other 
factors assessed. Most notably, the improvement of detection systems did not greatly 
affect the impact rate because the ship defensive abilities were limited by its weapons, 
not by its sensors. Because of the sensitivity to CIWS capability, a high fidelity model of 
the CIWS was critical to properly modeling this threat and response. 
Applications and user interfaces number beyond counting. It was not possible to 
survey all such tools or capture all applicable lessons learned. Instead, the project focused 
on collecting a few useful but very relevant examples to guide the development of the 
prototype. Three publications were identified that covered similar applications and user 
interfaces. None of these redefine general guidelines of good user interface design, but 
rather provide useful examples of well-implemented interfaces. 
The first publication focuses in map overlay software for discrete-event 
simulation data (Mack 2000). Discrete-event simulation:  
A general framework, build around the idea of “discrete events,” has been 
developed to help one follow a model over time and determine the 
relevant quantitates of interest. (Ross 2013) 
In Mack (2000), the application is called THORN, and it visualizes data from 
discrete-event simulations on an open-source mapping tool. The author emphasizes 
Shneiderman’s (1998) eight golden rules of interface design: 
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1. Strive for consistency 
2. Enable frequent users to use shortcuts 
3. Offer informative feedback 
4. Design dialogs to yield closure 
5. Offer error prevention and simple error handling 
6. Permit easy reversal of actions 
7. Support internal locus of control 
8. Reduce short-term memory load 
The THORN application provides a good example of the concept of layered 
information, allowing users to selectively enable and disable visuals to reduce clutter as 
needed. This concept is in line with the user needs expressed by former DDG 
commanding officers with experience in this field. 
The second publication is a path-planning application for the navigation of 
minefields (Piatko et al. 2001). Investigation into this report was prompted by the 
likening of loitering UAVs to “mines in the sky” by some stakeholders with extensive 
experience in the field. The mine path-planning application provided examples of simple, 
clear spatial information communicated through gray scale plotting overplayed on a map. 
The third publication detailed the development of a decision support system for 
maritime operational planning (Grasso et al. 2012). Grasso et al. (2012) proved to be one 
of the most relevant literature sources for the project showing numerous examples of 
maps filled with color-coded data. Especially of interest was their implementation of 
perceptual redundancy using a color map background to augment a vector field map 
overlay. 
Based on the literature, it was determined that an application was not currently 
available to cover the efforts of the intended capstone project goal. It was determined to 
use the relevant literature and stakeholder feedback to create a suitable GUI prototype. 
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E. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
The concept was to fill the information gap between specific UAV capabilities 
and the potential impact of those specific UAVs should an attack occur. Currently battle 
commanders have intelligence reports regarding UAVs in their respective areas of 
operation. These intelligence reports can include such information as possible type, 
location, number, and overall threat status of the country. The battle commander must 
take this information into consideration when making operational decisions. By providing 
the battle commanders with a tool that transforms pre-existing intelligence reports into 
situation-specific information, the battle commanders are provided more pertinent 
information with which to make informed decisions. 
As shown in Figure 11, the concept was to use a discrete-event simulation 
approach (referred as model in Figure 11) of a UAV attack on a specific ship and then 
utilize the outputs of the model to provide the battle commanders with the tactical 
information they required. 
Simulating a probabilistic model involves generating the stochastic 
mechanisms of the model and then observing the resultant flow of the 
model over time. Depending on the reasons for the simulation, there will 
be certain quantities of interest that we will want to determine. However, 
because the model's evolution over time often involves a complex logical 
structure of its elements, it is not always apparent how to keep track of this 
evolution so as to determine these quantities of interest. A general 
framework, built around the idea of "discrete events," has been developed 
to help one follow a model over time and determine the relevant quantities 
of interest. The approach to simulation based on this framework is often 
referred to as the discrete event simulation approach. (Ross 2013) 
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Figure 11. System Concept Diagram 
The concept allowed for future growth in both threat and own ship capabilities 
due to its reliance on modeling and simulation data. It was also the desire to ensure that 
the concept system did not require additional hardware components for its use by the 
battle commanders. The authors determined that the actual simulation runs and analysis 
of the outputs would require computing power and time that may not be available to users 
aboard the ships. As such, separating the discrete-event simulation from the user interface 
and only using the output of the model within the application was determined to be the 
preferred preliminary design concept. Additionally, this concept was adopted because of 
the flexibility it allowed with regards to the actual risk tool outputs. 
Following completion of problem space exploration, the authors learned what 
made a UAV swarm attacks unique, what ship board defensive systems existed, how a 
UAV attack might be defended against, and what information was currently available for 
battle commanders. The concept provided the authors with the opportunity to interview 
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III. USER-BASED NEEDS 
Chapter III discuss the human-centered design approach used in the project. The 
stakeholder analysis is explained in detail. Requirements are outlined and described. At 
the end of the chapter the functional analysis is presented. 
A. HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN 
Human-centered design (HCD) was used in conjunction with traditional systems 
engineering processes in order to develop rapidly a product for stakeholders. HCD is a 
way to develop a product form the design to prototype phase based on user needs. This is 
all done at a relatively low cost to the early phases of design. 
One of the major keys to HCD is design thinking. It is a critical relationship that 
allows HCD to be an effective design tool. Design thinking has multiple characteristics to 
aid in system development shown in the list below. These characteristics are essential in 
bounding the solution and scoping the problem during early stages of development. 
Critical to design thinking is that the development of a solution must be centered on 
human needs. Solutions must be based on user needs using a multi-disciplinary approach 
(Salem 2015).  Once the user needs are defined, initial low fidelity prototypes must be 
created and tested. These early low fidelity prototypes will help drive requirements. 
Prototype-test-prototype method drives this iterative process. The following list describes 
the characteristics of design thinking (Salem 2015): 
1. Innovation – Solutions come from a creative space where human 
intentions, business viability and technology feasibility intersect. 
Nontraditional approaches and thinking outside the box are highly 
encouraged. 
a. Bounded – Focused problem solving. Understanding the scope of 
the problem space. 
b. Solution Oriented – Focused on the solution and not the analysis. 
Come up with the solution quickly. 
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2. Human Centered – Make the human user the primary source for 
requirements, prototype acceptance, and all aspects of the solution. This is 
an attempt to reduce the requirement creep from the user in the final stages 
of development. 
a. Empathy – The problem should be understood from the user’s 
point of view. 
b. Empirical – Use the user’s experience and observation to 
determine the solution instead of theory and data analysis.  
c. Contextual – The solutions should always be related to the 
problem.  
d. User Need – The actual user needs should drive the requirements 
and functionality of the solution designed. 
e. Multi Discipline – All engineering disciplines should be a part of 
the initial design process to reduce integration issues during the 
final development. 
3. Prototype – Build multiple cheap prototypes that attempt to solve the 
problem early and often. Prototypes will help to define the requirements. 
a. Low Fidelity – Prototypes that are quickly and easily made in 
order to test the solution should not use a large amount of 
resources. 
b. Disposable – Multiple cheap prototypes will be built and tested 
before a final design is decided. 
4. Iterative – Build a prototype and then test it. Redesign the prototype based 
on the test results and test again. Continue this process until all 
requirements are teased out of the design. 
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a. Early and often – The more low fidelity prototypes that are built 
and tested, the better the solution will meet all the requirements of 
the user. 
b. Model Test Model – Redesign the model based on testing 
feedback. 
c. Evolution – The solution will evolve as more iteration occurs. 
These characteristics lead to a lot of benefits in the development of a system. It 
leads to a lot of ideas at the early stages. This allows for a large problem space to be 
explored. This problem space defines what the user needs are. Then the actual user is 
queried for his need based on the problem space exploration. This leads to multiple cheap 
prototypes that can be tested without the time and money needed to develop a single high 
fidelity prototype that might need to be changed after testing. The benefit of this iterative 
process is that there will be less requirements creep when a final prototype is designed, 
which saves the program a large sum of money. 
This project tailored the human-centered design process to design the Risk 
Assessment System GUI. As seen in Figure 12, the project started with the problem 
statement where efforts focused on identifying the problem. The next step was to identify 
and engage stakeholders. Users were interviewed in order to understand the problem 
further. They described the tactics, systems, kill chain, and thought processes that are 
relevant to the problem statement. This was used to identify the functionality and 
requirements required for the tool. Next step was to build and share the low fidelity 
prototype to the stakeholders. Based on feedback from stakeholders, requirements and 
user needs were updated. This was an iterative process, and feedback was essential in the 
human-centered design. The requirements shown later were updated multiple times 
because requirements fell out of prototype testing. 
 30 
 
Figure 12. Tailored Human-Centered Design Process 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Section B describes stakeholder analysis. This section includes all stakeholder 
interaction from identification of stakeholders to affinity diagrams of user needs. Careful 
examinations of the interviews helped to refine the limitations to scope as well as defined 
the user needs that drove the prototypes. 
1. Stakeholder Identification 
Once the problem statement was defined, the stakeholders had to be identified. 
The primary purpose is to give the warfighter the best information available to assess the 
risk of a UAV swarm attack. No one stakeholder could do all that is needed in order to 
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provide the context and user needs in order to accomplish this. This led to a need for 
multiple stakeholders over a spectrum of skillsets. Table 4 shows an initial list of 
stakeholders and the needs relevant to their position. Surface ship commanding officers, 
task force commanders, and fleet commanders are responsible for the safe execution of 
missions on a daily basis. The areas of responsibility (AOR) of these missions are ever 
changing, and these commanders have to reassess the risk with new intelligence 
information. They are the final decision makers on risk at the relative levels and would be 
the primary benefactors of the tool. They have to understand the inputs and outputs 
explicitly to make the best decision. Therefore, if the system does not have the proper 
input selections or the output does not present the information in a useful manner the 
system would be of no use. Planning teams and intelligence teams would most likely use 
this for planning purposes before executing a mission. This system would be used to 
consolidate the information that pertained to the risk of a UAV swarm attack against a 
ship. They would use the output to present to the decision makers so that they could make 
their determination. 
Table 4. Stakeholder and Needs 
Stakeholder (User) Needs 
Surface Ship Commanding Officers, 
Carrier Task Force Commander, Fleet 
Commander 
To get a consolidated report on possible 
threats to make informed decisions 
Operational Planning Teams, Area of 
Responsibility Commanders, Air 
Warfare Commanders 
To get damage assessment and make 
sense of data (intelligence of types of 
threats, how they are collected, the 
number of systems, damage evaluation 
based on data) 
Office of Naval Intelligence, JIAMDO To implement the tool solution and 
integrate other data and tool sets 
Shipboard Weapon and Detection 
System Program Offices, Navy 
Operational Test and Evaluation 
To understand how to improve the 
systems and to validate that the system 
meets the need 
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In order to refine the problem and bound the solution, the authors associated the 
initial needs based on the normal functions the stakeholder preforms, as described in 
Table 4. These needs are at a high level and were modified based on interaction with the 
stakeholders. These interactions were crucial to the development because they 
determined the initial requirements for the simulation and user interface. Stakeholders 
tested an initial prototype and their feedback was integrated into both the model and 
simulation (see Figure 13) to drive out new requirements. 
 
Figure 13. User Feedback in Development 
2. Limitations to Scope 
Before the stakeholders could be engaged, an initial attempt to limit the scope of 
the simulation and GUI was conducted. This was the initial step in bounding the solution. 
Figure 14 is based on the problem statement and CONOPs and represents the initial 
boundary of the system. This boundary was used to help define the scope of questioning 
of the users; scoping the system space allowed for more solution-oriented interview 
questions and testing. 
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This context diagram included the GUI, model/simulation, and the external 
factors that are relevant to the system. The far left of the diagram is the external inputs 
into the system. These are some of the proposed factors that would be entered by the user, 
such as number of ships, number of UAVs, ship and UAV types, and geographical 
location. Based on these inputs, the center box of the diagram is where the system will 
process the information to produce the output at the far right. 
The center box contains both the GUI and Model context. The GUI will process 
the input and deliver the output based on the response equations. It will provide the 
output that will be a visual representation to risk. This cannot occur without information 
that was provided by the model context. The model will provide the data needed to build 
the surface response equations based on the relevant factors to UAV swarm attack. There 
are limitations to the Model based on project scope. These scope limitations in the model 
will affect the allowable inputs by the user to the GUI. 
 
Figure 14. Overall System Context Diagram 
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3. Interviews 
The stakeholders were identified, initial needs were addressed, and the solution 
was scoped; then the interaction with stakeholders started in order to understand their 
needs. Human interaction is the crux of HCD. The first part of human interaction is the 
interview stage. 
The authors engaged in exercises of design thinking in order to develop the right 
questions. The first was to develop point of view (POV) statements and the second was to 
develop: “how might we” (HMW) statements. POV statements were used to gain insight 
into the user and his needs (Salem 2015). Simply said, User + need=insight (Salem 
2015). An example of the POV statements that were developed is seen in Figure 15. 
Multiple POVs were developed for each user. 
 
Figure 15 Point of View Example 
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“How might we” statements are questions that enhance the understanding of the 
problem space (Salem 2015). This allows for a better understanding of the impact of the 
users need. An example of the HMW exercise used on this project is seen in Figure 16. 
This HMW exercise also lead to the initial development of the visual organization of 
UAV threats and their risk output, Figure 17. 
 
Figure 16. Example of “How Might We” Questions 
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Figure 17. HMW Initial Visual Representation of Output 
The visual representations of how the authors would organize threats in Figure 17 
were actually some of the earliest examples in the prototyping process. For example, the 
upper right corner is an early example of how one would geographically represent the 
user and threat on the same map. The lower right hand corner is the development of how 
the interface would show the risk using risk cubes or text. One of the major purposes of 
this was to get as many low fidelity examples of threat organization as possible so that 
the authors could develop the visual representation interview questions. 
The POV, HMW, and CONOPS were finally used to develop the questions seen 
in Figure 18. This set of questions was written to allow for an open discussion of the 
stakeholder needs based on their position. The authors solicited the stakeholders opinions 
based on the system intended use. 
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Figure 18. IRB Approved Questions 
4. User Needs 
The authors interviewed former surface ship commanding officers, task force 
commanders and planning team members over a series of multiple interviews. 
Interviewees included multiple ranks within the kill chain from CAPTs to LTs to gain a 
wide variety of surface warfare perspective. Both the tactical and strategic areas of 
responsibility were examined. 
Interviews were conducted on the phone and in person with multiple groups of 
users. The authors collected notes on the users’ answers. The interview results were 
dissected into user needs. Those user needs were placed into like groups. A full affinity 
diagram of the user needs based on interviews can be seen in Figure 19. The reader is not 
intended to be able to read each note in Figure 19 but instead should have an idea of the 
contributions and iterations the authors had during the project to capture, define and 
group user needs from the interviews. 
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Figure 19. User Need Affinity Diagram 
This affinity helped organize the user needs for each section of the system. The 
groupings were defined for model input, model output, tool/application, user interface, 
blue force capabilities, and rules of engagement. Based on these groupings and the 
interviews, more scope limiting statements were determined. 
Blue force capabilities (Figure 20) and model inputs (Figure 21) could be further 
combined in order to describe the user needs for the model. The major influencing factor 
of blue force capability was the weapons systems available to counter the UAV swarm. 
The range, availability, and readiness of the CIWS, five-inch gun, and MGS will 
determine the weapon system the Commanding Officer (CO) will chose to engage with. 
The other major factor from the blue force was how the UAVs are detected. According to 
the COs, the detection system may have an issue with detecting and identifying a UAV in 
the clutter of a littoral environment. This littoral environment’s impact on the capability 
to detect and track was some of the primary needs for user input. The environmental 
factors such as time of day, visibility, sea state, weather and clutter were of the greatest 
concern to the user. Weather and clutter were too difficult to quantify for the purposes of 
the model and were deemed out of scope. 
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Figure 20. Blue Force Capabilities User Needs 
 40 
 
Figure 21. Model Input Guidance User Needs 
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The other aspect of model input that was of concern to the stakeholder was the 
type, number and location of UAVs. They did not want to have to enter into the software 
the flight envelopes and capabilities of the UAV. Therefore, the simulation/model would 
have to be run for a large range of capabilities and flight envelopes. This will allow for a 
single input of type of UAV. This is the same for the selection of ship type. However, 
they would like the ability to indicate what systems are functioning. The model will have 
to be run for a variety of different weapon system configurations. 
User interface, Figure 22, and tool/application, Figure 23, can be combined in 
order to address the needs of the GUI. In order to trust the tool, users wanted to keep the 
man out of the loop as much as possible. They saw UAVs similar to being mines in the 
sky. There are needs to have a tool to navigate safely around these “sky mines.” This tool 
would be used for planning purposes not for necessarily real time deployment. COs are 
more concerned with countering the attack than using a tool if the attack is underway. 
This tool would aid in battle commander decisions but would not drive the decision. COs 
already have too much to look at, and they need a simplified output. Users said the 
decision makers liked visual representation over text, but want ability to see the text that 
backs up the picture if needed. Use of color is good as long as it is not overwhelming and 
open to multiple interpretations. 
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Figure 22. User Interface Guidance User Needs 
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Figure 23. Tool Application User Needs 
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Time to react was one of the most unexpected results of the interviews. They were 
uncomfortable with attacking a UAV when they first detected it. It is very difficult to 
identify a UAV. It is even more difficult to identify a hostile act of a UAV. Because of 
this, the CO wants to know how much time he has to engage before he is vulnerable. This 
also gives the ship the ability to maneuver out of the threat zone or to get sailors safely 
inside, under cover. Rules of engagement (ROE), Figure 24, influence every decision that 
the CO makes. The CO would rather maneuver out of the threat zone or get sailors safely 
inside than to engage the target as a first response. Therefore, the tool has to aid in 
making decision that is in accordance with the ROE. 
 
 
Figure 24. Rules of Engagement User Needs 
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In summary, there were a lot of user needs that were expected and not expected. 
Maps with visual representation of hostile threat were thought to be a great way to 
quickly assess the risk geographically, as expected. Inputs such as type, number, and 
location of UAVs are needed along with types of ships and combinations of ships in 
order to produce a unique risk output to their situation. Some of the things not expected 
were the use of visual representation of time to react. This gave the ship the ability to 
maneuver instead of engage. The user did not see the product as a real-time tool. Users 
were also very concerned about how to identify correctly a hostile act, which would make 
them hesitant to engage. High level decision makers do not trust probabilities of 
occurrence to be a function of the tool. There is too much human bias in probability. 
C. REQUIREMENTS 
Section C discusses the requirement development process used for the system. 
The GUI input, functional and output requirements used to create the tool; a 
decomposition of discrete-event output simulation requirements. In addition, a complete 
list of the system requirements was included. 
1. Requirements Development Process 
As discussed earlier in the User Needs portion of this report, a series of interviews 
were conducted in order to determine the needs of potential users and stakeholders. Once 
all of the interviews were completed, the authors had several meetings to group those 
needs into a series of affinity diagrams. Requirements for the system were derived from 
the needs, and traced to the functions that accomplish them. Decomposition and 
traceability of the requirements were developed and documented using CORE. CORE 
from Vitech, Inc., is a model-based system engineering tool that provides comprehensive 
traceability from need definition through requirements and analysis to architecture and 
test. Using CORE, the requirements were broken down into five main sections to include 
GUI Input, GUI Functional, GUI Output, Support and Other, and, Discrete Output 




Figure 25. UAV Operational Swarm Assessment System Requirements 
Decomposition 
2. GUI Input Requirements 
The input requirements for the GUI (REQ.1.1) were decomposed or refined into 
nine separate requirements. All nine requirements form the basis of the Accept User 
Inputs Function. The input requirements for the GUI trace back to user needs for what 
they would like to see as inputs into the GUI. Further traceability has been established by 
allocating the Accept User Inputs Function, which is the software function that processes 
user inputs. Also in this case the Accept User Inputs Function has been allocated to the 
Computer Peripherals as shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. GUI Input Requirements Decomposition and Traceability 
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3. GUI Functional Requirements 
There are five functional requirements for the GUI that are can be traced to five 
functions required by the users. These functions are the ability for the user to enter inputs 
for the GUI independently, perform input validation as every software application should, 
respond to keyboard shortcuts, save inputs, and load inputs from a file, which in this case 
would be the output from the Discrete Event Simulator. Figure 27 demonstrates 
requirements traceability as each functional requirement form the basis of a base 
function, which performs that action. 
 
Figure 27. GUI Functional Requirements Decomposition and Traceability 
4. GUI Output Requirements 
How the GUI presents the results to the user is very critical for this application. 
As discussed earlier in, Chapter III Section B 3 Interviews, section the users requested 
several things that the GUI needed to be capable of providing output for. Outputs for the 
GUI include visually presenting reaction time versus range, displaying threat areas based 
on user input, producing outputs in a certain timeframe, text formatted, and in different 
file formats to include .ppt(x), .doc(x), and .pdf as shown in Figure 28. There are seven 
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output requirements that form the basis of the Provide User Outputs Function. The 
Provide User Outputs Function is allocated to the Software Program and Visual Display 
Components, which perform that function.  
 
Figure 28. GUI Output Requirements Decomposition and Traceability 
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5. Support and Other Requirements 
The Support and Other Requirements for the GUI include being able to run on a 
Windows® 7 or higher operating system as that is the enterprise operating system that is 
in used across the Navy. There is also a requirement that the GUI needs to have a 
modular architecture that has high cohesion and low coupling that allows for future 
updates to be inserted easily. Finally, the GUI needs to be simple enough to operate that a 
user with an intermediate level skillset could use it. During the interviews the users did 
not seem too concerned with the support requirements for the GUI, but these sorts of 
requirements are needed. Figure 29 shows requirements decomposition for the Support 
and Other Requirements. 
 
Figure 29. GUI Support and Other Requirements Decomposition 
6. Discrete Output Simulator Requirements 
The requirements for the Discrete Output Simulator, also known as ExtendSim 
model, were broken down into three high level requirements to include Blue Force 
Requirements, Red Force Requirements, and Environmental Factor Requirements. The 
Blue Force was further decomposed into five requirement sections as shown in Figure 30. 
The requirements under these five sections came from the user interview process.  
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Figure 30. Blue Force Requirements Decomposition 
Similarly, decomposition was also performed for the Red Force Requirements as 
shown in Figure 31. In this case there were also five sections that came as a result of the 
user interview process. In the Modeling and Simulation portion of this report, there is a 
more detailed description as to how these parameters are incorporated into the Discrete 
Output Simulator as shown in Figure 32. 
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Figure 31. Red Force Requirements Decomposition 
 
Figure 32. Discrete Output Simulator Environmental Factors Decomposition 
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The following is an all-inclusive list of the system requirements. The list is 
divided by the GUI inputs, functionality, output and other requirements. In addition, the 
discrete-event simulation requirements are included for the benefit of the reader and for 
future areas of study to improve this system. 
 
1. Requirements 
1.1. GUI Input Requirements 
1.1.1. The GUI shall accept sea state as an input. 
1.1.2. The GUI shall accept visibility as an input. 
1.1.3. The GUI shall accept the type of UAV as an input. 
1.1.4. The GUI shall accept the type of U.S. Naval Vessel as an input. 
1.1.5. The GUI shall accept the number of UAVs as an input. 
1.1.6. The GUI shall accept the speed of the UAV as in input. 
1.1.7. The GUI shall accept the distance to the nearest landmass on the suspected 
threat axis. 
1.1.8. The GUI shall accept the number of operational weapon systems as an 
input. 
1.1.9. The GUI shall auto-populate the attributes for the specific ship class and 
UAV. 
1.2. GUI Functionality Requirements 
1.2.1. The GUI shall allow the user to specify all discrete-event simulator inputs 
independently. 
1.2.2. The GUI shall perform input validation of user inputs. 
1.2.3. The GUI shall respond to common keyboard shortcuts. 
1.2.4. The GUI shall allow the user to save inputs to a file. 
1.2.5. The GUI shall allow the user to load saved inputs from a file. 
1.3. GUI Output Requirements 
1.3.1. The GUI shall use outputs from the discrete-event output simulator to 
produce outputs. 
 54 
1.3.2. The GUI shall be capable of visually presenting reaction time versus 
range, where the reaction time is equal to the time required to prevent a 
single UAV from hitting the ship. 
1.3.3. The GUI shall be capable of visually displaying threat areas based upon 
user inputs. 
1.3.4. The GUI shall be capable of producing outputs within 30 seconds of user 
initiation. 
1.3.5. The GUI shall format all outputs in text form. 
1.3.6. The GUI shall format the results graphically. 
1.3.7. The GUI shall be able to print the results to a .pdf, .doc(x), or .ppt(x) file. 
 
1.4. Support and Other Requirements 
1.4.1. The system shall be capable of operating on Windows® 7 or higher 
operating system. 
1.4.2. The system shall have a modular design to allow for updates that enhance 
the functionality based on future capabilities. 
1.4.3. The GUI shall be useable by personnel with a minimum Intermediate Skill 
Level. 
1.5. Discrete Output Simulator Requirements 
1.5.1. Blue Force Requirements 
1.5.1.1. Blue Force Position Requirements 
1.5.1.1.1. The blue force ship heading will remain in a constant 
direction. 
1.5.1.1.2. The blue force ship shall have a minimum speed 5 knots. 
1.5.1.1.3. The blue force ship shall have a maximum speed of 15 
knots. 
1.5.1.1.4. The blue force ship shall be modeled as a 570-foot circle. 
1.5.1.2. Blue Force Kill Requirements 
1.5.1.2.1. A blue force kill condition occurs when any UAV enters 
the 570-foot ship modeled circle. 
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1.5.1.3. Blue Force Weapon Requirements 
1.5.1.3.1. The blue force ship shall have three weapon systems 
available (5-in Gun, CIWS, and MGS). 
1.5.1.3.2. The blue force ship ammunition shall be unlimited. 
1.5.1.3.3. Each weapon system on the blue force ship shall have its 
own engagement range. 
1.5.1.3.4. Each weapon system on the blue force ship shall have its 
own PK. 
1.5.1.3.5. PK for each weapon system on the blue force ship shall 
decrease with an increase in sea state. 
1.5.1.4. Blue Force Detection Requirements 
1.5.1.4.1. The blue force ship shall have two different detection 
systems that are based on range (SPY-1D and EOSS). 
1.5.1.4.2. The blue force ship EOSS probability of detection PD shall 
decrease as visibility decreases. 
1.5.1.4.3. The weather shall not affect the ability of the blue force 
ship SPY-1D to detect. 
1.5.1.4.4. The firing solution of the blue force ship 5-in Gun shall be 
based on the PD for the SPY-1D. 
1.5.1.4.5. The firing solution of the blue force ship CIWS shall be 
based on the PD for the EOSS. 
1.5.1.4.6. The firing solution of the blue force ship machine gun shall 
be based on the PD for the EOSS. 
1.5.1.5. Blue Force Rules of Engagement Requirements 
1.5.1.5.1. The blue force ship shall positively identify a UAV before 
engagement. 
1.5.1.5.2. The blue force ship shall have a firing solution for the 
individual UAVs before weapon release. 
1.5.2. Red Force Requirements 
1.5.2.1. Red Force Position Requirements 
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1.5.2.1.1. The red force UAVs shall always be headed in a direction 
to intercept the blue force ship. 
1.5.2.1.2. The red force UAVs minimum speed shall be 80 knots. 
1.5.2.1.3. The red force UAVs maximum speed shall be 200 knots. 
1.5.2.1.4. The red force UAVs intercept angle shall vary. 
1.5.2.1.5. The red force UAVs shall vary in number. 
1.5.2.2. Red Force Kill Requirements 
1.5.2.2.1. A red force UAV kill condition occurs when any UAV is 
shot by any blue force ship weapon system. 
1.5.2.3. Red Force Weapon Requirements 
1.5.2.3.1. The red force UAVs shall only have a crush sensor (has to 
hit ship). 
1.5.2.3.2. The red force UAVs shall have no counter weapon systems. 
 
1.5.2.4. Red Force Detection Requirements 
1.5.2.4.1. The red force UAVs shall have the blue force ship position 
upon launch. 
1.5.2.5. Red Force Rules of Engagement Requirements 
1.5.2.5.1. The red force UAVs shall fly at maximum speed to the blue 
force ship. 
1.5.2.5.2. The red force UAVs shall detonate on impact with the blue 
force ship. 
1.5.3. Discrete Output Simulator Environmental Factors 
1.5.3.1.1. The sea state shall be an input to the discrete-event output 
simulator that will vary. 
1.5.3.1.2. The visibility shall be an input to the discrete-event output 
simulator that will vary. 
D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
User requirements were used to influence the high-level system design and 
functional analysis. A detailed breakdown of this analysis is provided below. 
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1. High-Level System Design 
Once the high-level system requirements were determined using the stakeholder 
interviews, a high-level system design was determined to help better understand the 
subsystem interactions required for the implementation of a working prototype. As shown 
in Figure 33, the system components include a high fidelity discrete-event simulation 
model of a UAV swarm attack on a ship, statistical analysis of the discrete-event model 
outputs, and a computer based GUI. The authors developed a discrete-event simulation in 
Extend Sim 9, top left of Figure 33, using controllable factors (discussed in Chapter IV) 
and problem space research (discussed in Chapter II) as inputs. Then a statistical analysis 
was performed with Minitab 17, top right of Figure 33, with the measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) results of the discrete-event simulation. The statistical analysis goal was to 
develop response equations to be used as the building blocks of the GUI dashboard 
created in MATLAB (bottom of Figure 33). The GUI dashboard (discussed in Chapter V) 
used the problem space research (discussed in Chapter II), user inputs and stakeholder 
requirements (discussed in Chapter III), and the response equations (discussed in Chapter 
IV) as inputs to create the risk assessment tool outputs. 
 
Figure 33. High Level System Design 
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Given the complexity of the discrete-event simulation and the statistical analysis 
of its outputs, it was determined that the GUI should be a stand-alone subsystem that 
utilizes response equations in order to produce outputs that fulfill user requirements. By 
making the discrete-event simulation and the statistical analysis separate from the GUI, 
task-specific commercial software could be used to perform the required work. For the 
purpose of this project, ExtendSim was used to create and run the discrete-event 
simulation, Minitab was used to create the design of experiments (DoE) and statically 
analyze the results, and MATLAB was used to create the GUI dashboard with which the 
user ultimately interacts. Ultimately, the decision to use these specific software packages 
was based upon previous experience and ease of use. 
2. Functional Breakdown 
Using the high-level system design and user defined requirements, a functional 
analysis of the system was preformed to ensure that all defined and derived requirements 
were met. For the purpose of this project, the CORE software program was used to 
perform the functional analysis and track requirements. In general, the functional analysis 
was performed using a top-down method of all required functions and their interactions. 
Upon completion of the functional analysis for one level, a functional breakdown was 
then completed for the next lower level. Due to the functional requirements of the system, 
a functional breakdown was performed down to the third level. A very simplistic design 
architecture was used for the design of the system since the interactions amongst the 
subsystem functions was singular in nature. 
The primary goal of the top-level functional analysis of the system was to ensure 
that the scope of the project and the required mechanisms were identified. As shown in 
Figure 34, the entire system is comprised of two main functions: Model UAV Swarm 
Attacks and Perform UAV Risk Assessment (GUI). As previously discussed, the scope of 
the system and classification level of the project was important controls for the overall 
system; however, a similar functional breakdown could be used for future development 
with these controls removed. 
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Figure 34. System IDEF0 
Function 1.0, Model UAV Swarm Attacks, encompassed the discrete-event 
modeling and simulation including the statistical analysis of the results. As such, two 
mechanisms were required for the function, Discrete Modeling Software and Statistical 
Analysis. An IDEF0 and functional hierarchy of Function 1.0 are shown in Figure 35 and 
Figure 36. Research performed during the problem space exploration and stakeholder 
interviews were used to determine the controllable factors. 
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Figure 35. Discrete Model IDEF0 
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Figure 36. Discrete Model Functional Hierarchy 
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Once the statistical analysis was completed, the only output of the Function 1.0 
was the Response Equations that were ultimately used by the GUI to create required 
outputs. Further discussion on the implementation of this functional breakdown, 
controllable factors used, and the statistical analysis performed on the discrete-event 
simulation results is located in Chapter IV. 
Function 2.0, Perform UAV Risk Assessment (GUI), shown in Figure 37, was the 
main focus of the functional analysis, shown in Figure 38, with respect to the user 
defined functional requirements. Based upon stakeholder interviews, it was determined 
that user GUI interaction was a key requirement. To be more specific, user input 
requirements were UAV type, Ship Type, Number of UAVs, Littoral Range, and 
Defensive Weapons Systems. In addition, these inputs were required to be text based 
with limited capability for auto-filling data inputs based upon an internal library of fixed 
values. As discussed earlier, the scope of the system was a significant control; however, 
given that all data used for the inputs is open-source, classification level was not a control 
for the GUI. 
 
Figure 37. GUI IDEF0 
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Figure 38. GUI Functional Hierarchy 
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Once Function 2.1 accepted all the user inputs, the Response Equations from 
Function 1.0 were used to create the required outputs. The primary interaction within 
Function 2.0 occurred within Function 2.2. It was at this point where the Response 
Equations and User Inputs were both required. Since the system was required to both 
display the outputs and save them for future use, Function 2.3, Publish Outputs, was 
required. Again, the different categories of outputs were based on user requirements 
whereas Sensitive Outputs refers to significant outputs that the user is made aware of and 
Numerical and Graphical Outputs refer to the different ways that the user required the 
data to be displayed. 
Similar to Function 1.0, Scope of the System was a significant control for 
Function 2.0. As before, this control was mainly driven by the scope of the project. 
Further discussion on the implementation of this functional breakdown in the GUI 
prototype can be found in Chapter V. 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Chapter IV introduces the modeling and simulation portion of the system. The 
chapter discusses the scope, assumptions and, design of the simulation. The design of 
experiments, factor analysis and output analysis is discussed in detail. The integration 
with the GUI is explained with a high level summary and recommendations. 
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION INTRODUCTION 
The authors created a discrete-event simulation of a basic UAV swarm attack on a 
U.S. Navy surface ship using ExtendSim 9. Although many changes have been made by 
several of the authors before and during this capstone project, the original basis for this 
model can be traced all the way back to Dr. Rama Gehris’, professor of practice at the 
NPS, original “Zombies Model” used in SE3250 Capabilities Engineering class at NPS. 
The purpose of this effort was to create a way for the authors to explore and analyze the 
trade-space primarily in order to identify those input factors that would have the greatest 
effect on the scenario outcome. Human factors engineering principles for the design of 
effective user interfaces dictate that 
The most important elements should be easily perceived. Non-critical 
elements should be de-emphasized and clutter should be minimized so as 
not to hide critical information. (Martine 1995) 
So it was necessary for the authors to identify those important elements in order to 
design an effective GUI. Another reason for creating the simulation was to generate a 
realistic equation representing the relationships between factors. This equation was then 
used by the GUI to provide outputs that respond to inputs in a generally correct manner 
so that they make sense to the user interviewees during demonstration. The authors 
determined that this extra step using human-centered design yielded insights into the GUI 
design that ultimately resulted in a higher fidelity prototype. 
The input data set was created based on open source references on UAV and U.S. 
Navy surface ship performance and capabilities discussed in detail in Chapter II. The 
design of experiments was set up using Minitab 17. The response equation and the 
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graphical representations of the simulation outputs were generated using Minitab 17. The 
data flow relationships between the three tools used in this project (ExtendSim 9, 
MATLAB GUI and Minitab 17) are shown in Figure 39, but the two components of this 
relationship discussed in detail in this chapter are the ExtendSim model and Minitab 
statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 39. Data Flow Architectural Layout 
 
B. SIMULATION SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to make the project feasible with the amount of time and manpower 
available, while maintaining the unclassified nature of this effort, it was necessary to 
make several simplifying assumptions in the design of the simulation. These 
simplifications allowed the authors to create an initial simulation that meets the project 
requirements of identifying the important input factors and providing a realistic equation 
to drive the MATLAB GUI. Thus these assumptions gave the authors the ability to go 
further in the design iterations of the project and enable them to collect customer 
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feedback by presenting a proposed product that accurately represents the design concept. 
Below are listed the assumptions used in the simulation: 
1. Blue Force Characteristics 
1.1. The authors are modeling a single ship only and do not address any 
cooperative interaction of multiple U.S. ships operating close together.  
1.2. The authors are only modeling the unclassified, publicly available data on 
capabilities of current U.S. weapon systems. The potential effects of 
theoretical enhanced future weapon system capabilities are out of scope 
for this project. 
1.3. The ship’s weapon systems represented in the simulation include the 
Mk45 Five-Inch Gun, Mk15 CIWS, and the Mk38 MGS.  
1.4. Blue force weapons have an unlimited ammunition supply in the 
simulation. 
1.5. The simulated ship is operating in tightly constrained maneuvering 
environments, such as a straits transit, where it is forced to sail near the 
shoreline of a hostile nation. The ship does not have the freedom to 
simply leave the high threat area.  
1.6. The maneuverability of the ship is not modeled. Although the ship is 
moving at a constant speed and direction during the engagement, the ship 
does not execute any defensive maneuver in response to the attack.  
1.7. At the start of each run, the ship’s speed is randomly set between 0kts and 
31kts and will remain constant throughout that simulation run.  
1.8. Use of the Mk45 five-inch gun requires UAV detection and track by the 
SPY-1D radar before it can fire. 
1.9. Use of the Mk15 Close-In Weapon System and Mk 38 Machine Gun 
System requires a UAV detection and track by the Mk 20 EOSS, which is 
affected by weather. 
1.10. The detection range of the SPY-1D is unaffected by weather and is 
greater than the distances between the ship and the shore.  
2. Attack Characteristics  
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2.1. A single side attack is simulating. The UAV swarm has not surrounded 
the ship but instead has come directly from hostile launch locations 
ashore and is proceeding directly towards the ship.  
2.2. Weapons cutouts are not considered because the authors assumed a beam 
attack where all the weapons are able to shoot in the direction of the 
approaching swarm. 
2.3. Weapons swing rate is not explicitly modeled, however, it is accounted 
for in the random additional time required to acquire the next target. This 
effect also implies that, in simulation space, the UAVs are slightly spread 
out in azimuth, altitude or both. 
2.4. The simulation does not consider precisely where on the ship the UAV 
might impact. There are no damage effects or ship’s survivability 
considerations. The assumption is that, due to a possible chemical, 
biological or radiological warhead, having a single UAV reaching the 
ship is unacceptable.  
2.5. If, or when, one UAV reaches the ship, the simulation run ends with the 
ship defeated and proceeds to the next run. 
2.6. If all of the UAVs are shot down without one reaching the ship, the 
simulation run ends with a blue victory and proceeds to the next run. 
3. Environment 
3.1. The time of day is not taken into account in the simulation. There is no 
modeled effect on the ship’s systems due to sun position, thermal 
crossover, or any other time of day related issue that might cause sensor 
degradation in the real world. 
3.2. Sensor degradation and weapon effectiveness due to visibility and sea 
state are approximated with a decreased probability of detection (PD) 
factor.  
3.3. Sea state affects the weapon systems probability of kill (PK). 
4. Threat UAV Characteristics 
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4.1. The example threat UAVs that were modeled are the Yasir, Ababil-T and 
Harpy. The tactical scenario that was modeled involved relatively short 
ranges, which are sufficiently less than the range capabilities of all three 
of these UAVs. Therefore UAV range is not an issue. The key aspects of 
UAV performance to be represented in the model are the minimum and 
maximum speeds. Using publicly available information, the authors have 
chosen a speed range from 70 knots up to 200 knots. When the UAV 
swarm is generated, the speed is set randomly between these values. The 
UAV swarm will fly at that constant speed for the duration of the run. 
4.2. The UAV will fly directly at the ship without any evasive maneuvers or 
counter measures. 
4.3. The UAV is either fully effective or completely destroyed. There is no 
damage, soft kill or partial kill of the UAV.  
4.4. UAVs can be detected, tracked and identified only when over water. This 
stems from an assumption that they would be operated at low altitude by 
the enemy in an attempt to hide in the ground clutter over land. 
C. SIMULATION DESIGN 
The general architecture of the simulation is represented graphically in Figure 40. 
Starting on the left side, the number of UAVs to be generated during a run, and their 
distance from the ship as they cross the shoreline, is read from the input database. The 
simulation references the range and visibility for each run and determines at what range 
the UAVs are detected. The swarm of UAVs passes through the weapons engagement 
zone (WEZ) of each of the three modeled weapon systems. Each weapon continues to 
fire at the UAVs for as long as the UAV is within the weapon’s WEZ. The simulation 
determines when, or if, each UAV is shot down based on the weapon’s Probability of Kill 
(PK), which is related to range. The simulation continues until all UAVs are destroyed, or 
until one UAV reaches the ship. When each run ends, the simulation logs the ending 
conditions in the output file and proceeds to the next run.  
 70 
 
Figure 40. Simulation Process Flowchart 
Using ExtendSim 9, the simulation was laid out following the basic architecture 
and data flow shown in Figure 40. All of the major process steps are visible in the 
ExtendSim screen shots, shown in Figure 41 and Figure 42 with annotations identifying 
the major components of the model. The model generates the UAVs and sets their 
attributes before tracking them as they fly out toward the ship. The model determines 
when the UAVs can be detected and passes them to the Engagement Loop. In the 
Engagement Loop the Probability of Kill for each weapon system, modified by range, sea 
state, and visibility, is used to determine if each UAV is hit or missed by each shot 
attempt. After each pass through the Engagement Loop, the UAV is routed according to 
its status either back through the Engagement Loop again or to one of the exit blocks. 
There is an exit block for UAVs that are duds, that hit the ship and that are shot down by 




Figure 41. Screenshot of ExtendSim UAV Swarm Simulation, First Half 
 
 
Figure 42. Screenshot of ExtendSim UAV Swarm Simulation, Second Half 
The simulation was tested for stability and functionality without issue. The 
simulation typically took about 33 seconds to complete 1000 runs using a Windows 
laptop with an Intel Pentium CPU. 
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D. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS AND FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Initially, the list of controllable factors in this simulation design was as inclusive 
as possible. The authors did not know which factors would be significant without 
analyzing them first, and they wanted to ensure an exhaustive factor exploration. The 
initial controllable factors included distance, number of UAVs, UAV speed, ship speed, 
visibility, sea state, PK for each weapon system, human response time, and number of 
CIWS systems. These factors were determined during the early phases of the project. 
They were extensively researched and believed to be potentially relevant by the authors.  
An initial design of experiments data table was created in Minitab 17 for a two 
level, 11 factor DoE requiring 2048 runs for a single replication. This simple two level 
DoE is used initially in order to identify the factors that are most significant to the 
scenario outcome. All 11 factors were included for completeness and only one replication 
was necessary at this point because the authors were not interested in statistical 
significance yet. The high and low values from each controllable factor were used to 
define the two levels. Minitab 17 was set to randomize the run order to minimize any 
potential unforeseen effects from external factors that are not part of this study. The DoE 
table of input data was copied from Minitab 17 and pasted directly into the ExtendSim 9 
read database. When the simulation runs were complete, the ExtendSim output database 
was cut and pasted back into Minitab 17 for analysis. 
The purpose of this initial set of runs was to identify the important factors that 
influence the output. The outcome permitted the authors to separate the important factors 
from those that were not with the purpose of focusing on the top few factors that affected 
the outcome. Using Minitab 17 a factorial analysis was conducted and the Pareto chart of 
standardized effects was created shown in Figure 43. This chart graphically indicates the 
magnitude of the influence each input has on the outcome of the simulated scenario. On 
the x-axis, the chart displays the absolute value of the standardized effect and includes a 
reference line at the Pareto-value of 1.97, which corresponds to a 95 percent confidence 
level. Any factor that extends to the right of this reference line passes the statistical 
hypothesis test and it can be concluded with 95 percent confidence, that the factors are 
statistically significant and not just irregularities in the data. 
 73 
 
Figure 43. Pareto Chart of Standardized Effects Produced by Minitab 17 
The analysis shows that the most significant factors are the number of UAVs in 
the swarm, the distance from the ship to the shore (where the UAVs are expected to be 
detected), and the speed of the UAVs. Besides those three main factors, there are two 
other factors with less significance but that still pass the 95 percent confidence reference 
line. These factors are the prevailing meteorological visibility (which affects the range 
that the Mk38 MGS can be employed) and the number of Mk15 CIWS systems on the 
ship. The other six factors did not significantly affect the simulation outcome and were 
therefore changed to fixed values in subsequent runs of the model. This factor screening 
reduced the original 11 factors down to just four controllable factors and one categorical 
factor (number of CIWS).  
A second design of experiments was then created that focused on those four 
factors with significant impact on the simulation outcome. The purpose of this second set 
of runs was to provide a more filled out and statistically significant field of data with, 




























Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is Engagement Success, α = 0.05)
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with many more design points. The authors conducted the factor analysis first in order to 
reduce the number of factors being studied, because if they used all 11 factors the total 
number of runs required would have been excessive (over 2 billion) and unmanageable. 
Lessons learned by team members in SE3250 shows that a minimum of 30 
replications are required in order to achieve statistical significance. Five levels for each 
factor have shown to provide adequate data for a reliable regression during early tests of 
the model. The authors chose to use five levels for each of the four factors with 40 
replications because this combination of five levels, four factors and 40 replications 
yielded a round number of 25,000 runs. The predicted run time was approximately 13 
minutes and actual run time was closer to 15 minutes. 
E. OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
With the final runs complete, the results were again pasted into Minitab 17 for 
analysis. This time the regression feature was used to fit a response surface to the output 
data. This generated the equations, shown in Figure 44 and Figure 45, which represent 
the likelihood of a successful engagement (blue ship victory) given the range of input 
factors. These equations can be considered a “meta-model,” which is an equation, or set 
of equations, that represents the output of the simulation, and will be used to control the 
GUI. 
 
Figure 44. Probability of Blue Force Victory (Success) with One CIWS 
 
Figure 45. Probability of Blue Force Victory (Success) with Two CIWS 
Success = 0.0585 - 0.01707 NumUAVs + 0.06161 Dist + 0.001080 UAVSpeed  
+ 0.5414 Vis - 0.000839 NumUAVs*Dist - 0.000053 NumUAVs*UAVSpeed  
- 0.01080 NumUAVs*Vis - 0.000149 Dist*UAVSpeed - 0.00312 Dist*Vis  
- 0.000958 UAVSpeed*Vis 
Success = 0.2561 - 0.01770 NumUAVs + 0.06419 Dist + 0.000431 UAVSpeed  
+ 0.5675 Vis - 0.000839 NumUAVs*Dist - 0.000053 NumUAVs*UAV Speed  
- 0.01080 NumUAVs*Vis - 0.000149 Dist*UAVSpeed - 0.00312 Dist*Vis  
- 0.000958 UAVSpeed*Vis 
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Several contour plots were generated in order to visualize the data and study the 
behavior of the model. Each of these plots shows the relationship between three of the 
key factors. In each plot the response, Success, is represented on the z-axis by the change 
in colors as a function of the other two factors. For example, Figure 46 shows that with 
20 UAVs, the probability of success is zero no matter how far away they start. On the 
other hand, with only five UAVs and at ranges as short as 6,000 feet, the probability of 
success is between 60 percent and 80 percent. All distances are in thousands of feet and 
speeds are in feet per second. The visibility metric is a percent degradation below ideal 
conditions. Figure 46 and Figure 47 show the expected behavior based on the simulation 
runs data analysed. 
 




























Contour Plot of Success vs Dist, Num UAVs
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Figure 47. Contour Plot of Success Versus UAV Speed and Visibility 
However, Figure 48 and Figure 49, indicate some surprising and complex 
interaction between factors. It is this complexity that proves the need for advanced 


























Contour Plot of Success vs UAV Speed, Vis
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Figure 48. Contour Plot of Success Versus UAV Speed and Number of UAVs 
 
 




















































Contour Plot of Success vs UAV Speed, Dist
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F. INTEGRATION WITH THE GUI  
The development of the ExtendSim 9 model proceeded in parallel with the design 
of the GUI and the demonstrations of the concept to the interviewees. As new 
requirements were generated and new revelations were discovered, the details of the 
simulation design had to evolve along the way. Most of these midpoint simulation design 
changes came in the form of minor features or characteristics of modeled weapon 
systems such as the Mk38 MGS’s limitation of not being able to be used without a visual 
acquisition of a UAV. In general, the simulation design and development was in a 
supporting role to the GUI development in this project. In a few small ways, however, 
there was some reverse flow of design influence. For example, in some cases the 
simplifications desired by the authors developing the simulation feedback to the design of 
the GUI. Examples of this feedback are the preference to avoid the complexities of 
modeling the time of day and relative sun position effects and the desire to model only a 
limited number of ship classes based on the project scope, complexity and time available. 
As a result, the final GUI design has no time of day input and only allows the selection of 
two ship classes. 
One of the most significant unexpected design changes and subsequent 
interactions between the two efforts came as a result of the second round of interviews. 
The interviewees stated that they would prefer to see a display output on the GUI that 
gave them an indication of the time available to react, and still have some confidence in 
victory, for a given scenario. This was a departure from the initial design assumption that 
the tool would be providing an indication of the risk for a given scenario. Not only did 
this drive a major change to the GUI controls and output display, it also caused a 
challenge for the simulation, which had been designed up to that point to produce an 
equation in terms of the probability of victory, not time. 
After the authors returned from the second round of interviews, they researched 
how to produced equations that yielded response time as function of other controllable 
factors. The key challenge was that time was not one of the model factors, so the authors 
could not simply algebraically solve the equations for time. The authors realized, 
however, that time was a function of the UAV speed and the distance that they are 
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detected. They applied the alteration to the simulation data already in Minitab 17. The 
authors took the numerical value of the distance factor for each run and divided it by the 
value of the UAV speed for each run, and created a new column of data labeled “time.” 
Then using Minitab’s data analysis features, the authors fitted a regression equation to the 
data and time was selected as the response and included probability of success as one of 
the factors. This yielded the two equations in Figure 50 and Figure 51. 
 
Figure 50. Required Response Time in Seconds with One CIWS 
 
Figure 51. Required Response Time in Seconds with Two CIWS 
These equations were used directly in the final MATLAB GUI code to provide 
the time required to respond as an output for a given set of user inputs, including the 
desired probability of success. 
G. SIMULATION SUMMARY 
Despite the significant limitations of schedule and resources, the authors were 
able to successfully create a discrete-event simulation that achieved two objectives. The 
authors were also very successful at manually integrating and using the three off-the-shelf 
software tools: ExtendSim 9, Minitab 17 and MATLAB GUI. The ExtendSim simulation 
paired with Minitab for data analysis, allowed to explore the trade-space and identify 
those input factors that had the greatest effect on the scenario outcome. Using Minitab, 
the authors were also able to generate a response equation to represent the simulation 
output. This response equation was used to drive the MATLAB GUI and enable 
immediate responses to user inputs, without the need to constantly re-run the simulation. 
Time = -2.63 + 0.769 NumUAVs + 53.460 Dist - 0.0487 UAVSpeed - 24.39 Vis 
+ 45.047 Success + 0.03779 NumUAVs*Dist + 0.002382 NumUAVs*UAVSpeed 
+ 0.487 NumUAVs*Vis - 0.124281 Dist*UAVSpeed + 0.141 Dist*Vis 
+ 0.0431 UAVSpeed*Vis 
 
Time = -11.54 + 0.797 NumUAVs + 53.344 Dist - 0.0194 UAVSpeed - 25.56 Vis 
+ 45.047 Success + 0.03779 NumUAVs*Dist + 0.002382 NumUAVs*UAVSpeed 
+ 0.487 NumUAVs*Vis - 0.124281 Dist*UAVSpeed + 0.141 Dist*Vis 
+ 0.0431 UAVSpeed*Vis 
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Ultimately this methodology enabled the authors to create a prototype that was closer to 
realism than the authors would otherwise have been able to create without these tools. 
H. SIMULATION RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Extensive assumptions and simplifications were employed in this project in order 
to keep the effort unclassified and to remain within the constraints of schedule, 
computing power, and technical skills of the students. If this project were to be adopted 
as a program of record by the Navy, it should include the development of a higher fidelity 




V. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE 
Of equal importance to the discrete-event simulation developed by the authors to 
assess the threat of UAV swarm attacks under various conditions is the user interface 
developed to let users explore, interpret, and share those results. The authors developed a 
prototype user interface based in MATLAB GUI, emulating a web-based application. 
This prototype follows several generations whose development started with whiteboard 
drawings and guided through the iteration by stakeholder feedback. 
A. INITIAL DESIGN DRIVERS 
Through interviews with stakeholders, the authors identified four characteristics 
that were critical to the effectiveness and suitability of the interface design. The software 
solution must be lightweight, user friendly, exportable, and modifiable. 
1. Lightweight 
Since the original concept, the user interface has been imagined as a simple, 
lightweight, fast-running window into the simulation results, recorded externally, which 
does not include the simulation itself. The concept needed to be altered in the iterations to 
fit user needs but the main idea remained constant. 
The simulation may take minutes to hours to produce results, depending on the 
variety of factors included and the level of statistical confidence desired. The authors do 
not expect it would be feasible to compensate with more powerful computers nor could 
they reasonably expect users to wait hours for their results. Instead, calling upon recorded 
simulation results could be done quickly enough for the user interface to respond 
instantly and constantly to user inputs. 
The most robust means of recording the simulation results is a database. The user 
interface would query the database with the user inputs and provide the results. However, 
it would be faster and require less memory if the results could be refined into a 
polynomial expression. Analysis of the data in the statistical software Minitab 17 
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indicates that the results of the simulation, over the parameters investigated, are well 
represented by such an equation. 
2. User Friendly 
Though this application presents no unique requirements for usability, it, as all 
user software, stands to benefit in terms of acceptance and usefulness by addressing such 
concerns. To this end, the authors made an effort to develop a prototype that was familiar, 
intuitive, and aesthetic. 
Familiarity with a tool can improve initial user acceptance and decrease the 
necessary training for users. The user interface includes common menu items such as 
Save, Open, Quit, and Reset. These are augmented with the usual keyboard shortcuts, for 
example, Ctrl+S for Save. 
The desire for an intuitive design prompted the authors to place inputs along the 
left of the screen and outputs along the right – following the left-to-right flow common to 
English readers. Additionally, the colored indications of UAV threat were styled so that 
red indicates the highest threat and blue the lowest. 
Though again limited by the experience of the authors—none being professional 
software developers—user feedback encouraged emphasis on aesthetics in the design. 
Even as early as the first digital prototypes, it was clear users focused on aspects of the 
design that had aesthetic appeal, or colloquially: coolness factor. This, in part, motivated 
the shift from a simple initial software prototype to the resulting more colorful, modernly 
styled final prototype. 
3. Exportable 
As confirmed by user feedback, a tool like the one the authors suggest here is 
likely to be operated by personnel who advise decision makers, but are not CO or other 
decision makers themselves. As such, it is important that the user be able to export the 
results. Users expressed interest in Microsoft Word, Microsoft PowerPoint, and Portable 
Document Format (PDF) document export formats. The development of these export 
features was not part of this prototype development effort. 
 83 
4. Modifiable 
Performing this work without the use of classified information has greatly limited 
the fidelity of the model the authors were able to produce and prove. Therefore, the 
authors consider essential that the architecture shall be flexible to future updates. The 
development of the user interface was done with good programming practices in mind, 
emphasizing readability of code, error handling, and general reusability. 
B. DEVELOPMENT  
The GUI development was based on a whiteboard drawing, static prototype and 
followed by a simple MATLAB GUI application that evolved as a web-app emulator. 
1. Whiteboard Drawings 
The initial concept for the user interface was fleshed out on a blackboard. At such 
an early stage, the concepts were not shown to stakeholders and instead were iterated 
based on internal feedback. One such blackboard diagram is shown in Figure 52. 
 
Figure 52. Blackboard Schematic: Early Model and User Interface Input and 
Output Refinement and a Few Basic Sketches of Output Visualization Concepts 
Further refinement was done on whiteboards, both real and virtual, that the 
authors began to visualize the layout of the user interface. (The choice of whiteboard 
versus blackboard was merely one of availability.) Figure 53 represents the first 




Figure 53. Whiteboard Drawings: A Whiteboard (Top Left) and Virtual 
Whiteboard (Bottom Right) Containing Drawings of Early Concepts of the User 
Interface Layout 
2. Static Prototype 
After the whiteboard drawings, the authors constructed a static prototype. This 
prototype looked like an operational Windows application. Though many of the fields 
were yet to be specified—see the overlaid text in Figure 54—this prototype gave a 
chance to get stakeholder feedback on the layout, appearance, and menu choices. 
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Figure 54. Static Prototype: A Nonfunctional but Realistic Looking Prototype 
3. Simple MATLAB App 
Motivated by available experience, the authors chose to develop the first 
functional prototype in MATLAB GUI. The initial task was to create a functional replica 
of the static prototype. The results of that effort are shown in Figure 55. This was 
completed partially in parallel with the development of the static app. The feedback 
received helped the authors shape the next functional prototype, which received the most 
user scrutiny of them all. 
 86 
 
Figure 55. First Functional Prototype: This Prototype was Developed in 
MATLAB and was Designed to be a Functional Version of the Static Prototype. 
The next MATLAB GUI prototype changed the layout, as shown in Figure 56, 
keeping some of the components and eliminating others. Interviews with stakeholders 
revealed that the characterization of UAV swarm threats as a risk was neither intuitive 
nor appealing. Instead, stakeholders wanted to emphasize the threat map. This prototype 
reincorporated the feature that was first introduced in the static prototype: ship 
configuration lookup. Rather than ask the user to manually enter every parameter, the 
authors added a dropdown menu (also called a popup menu) that the user can select the 
ship and the parameters will be adjusted to match. 
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Figure 56. Second Functional Prototype: This Iteration Drastically Altered the 
Layout, Emphasized the Map, Got Rid of the Risk Cube, and Added the Ship 
Configuration Lookup Feature. 
4. Web-App Emulator 
The development path ends with the current design iteration. Following the 
feedback received primarily from a hands-on interview that was brought from the second 
functional prototype to a group of naval officers, the user interface layout was reimagined 
in Figure 57. In this iteration, the emphasis on the map is taken to the extreme. The 
characteristics of this final user interface prototype are discussed in the following section. 
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Figure 57. Web-App Prototype: The Final Prototype of This Effort. 
C. USER GUIDE/DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUI 
The final prototype developed as part of this effort was created to emulate a web-
hosted application. In concept, users would access the application remotely across a 
SIPRNET connection. For practicality in development of this prototype, the interface was 
created using the MATLAB GUI language. By design, the use of MATLAB GUI is 
hidden from a user interacting with the interface. As such, the use of MATLAB GUI does 
not affect the way a user would interact with the application. MATLAB GUI enters into 
the discussion below only to describe the behind-the-scenes processing executed by the 
application. In addition, the MATLAB GUI complete script was included in Appendix B. 
1. Entering Inputs 
In Figure 58, the parameters that drive the application output can be specified 
within the tabbed sidebars along the left edge of the interface. The tabs categorize input 
fields by commonality. Inputs describing the defending ship are all contained on the Ship 
Inputs tab. The UAV Inputs tab allows the user to specify the characteristics of each 
UAV launch site. UAV threats are assumed to be homogeneous, but disparate sites are 
defined separately and need not share characteristics. Characteristics of the environment 
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during the engagement are specified in the Environment tab. In the Notes tab, users can 
add notes to the application to capture custom information in the exported documents. 
For the purposes of this simulation, the defending ship is described only by the 
number of CIWS it carries. Though the simulation investigated other variables, a Pareto 
analysis whittled down the parameter space to only the significant factors. 
Instead of specifying each of these values individually, users can select their 
platform from a list of known platforms and the parameters will be updated to match. 
Users can then adjust the parameters to customize the ship specification. See Figure 58 
for an example of the ship input fields. 
 
Figure 58. Ship Inputs 
UAV launch sites can be created using the plus sign button at the bottom of the 
UAV tab. Existing UAV launch sites can be deleted using the nearby minus sign button. 
When a UAV launch site is created, the UAV characteristics are populated with default 
values. The user can change any of these values. The UAV parameters relevant to this 
simulation are quantity and speed. 
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As with the ship parameters, UAV characteristics can be specified quickly be 
selecting a known UAV from the available list. For a UAV type specified this way, the 
application will display other relevant information in the lower part of the tab. The UAV 
input fields are shown in Figure 59. 
 
Figure 59. UAV Inputs 
The simulation environment is specified in terms of visibility as shown in Figure 
60. Visibility is specified as a multiplier on the probability of kill in the simulation. A 
visibility of 100 percent does not reduce the ship’s defenses at all, whereas a visibility of 
10 percent causes ten times more misses. Because visibility is naturally limited to a value 
between 0 and 100 percent, the visibility parameter is set by the user via a slider. 
Furthermore, because the polynomial approximation of simulation results is not reliable 
for visibilities close to zero, the lower limit of the slider is set to 20 percent. 
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Figure 60. Environment Inputs 
2. Interpreting the Map View 
The primary output of this application is a map of the region of interest, colored to 
indicate threat level as shown in Figure 61. This tool characterizes threat level as a 
probability of successful engagement. Success here is the elimination of all UAVs with 
no damage to the ship. Therefore, this map view can be used to estimate risk when path 
planning. Overlaid on the colored map are contour lines every 10 percent. These make 
interpreting the colors easier and allow colorblind users to still interpret the results. 
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Figure 61. UAV Threat Map View 
This map is intended to answer the question, “what are the chances that my ship 
can pass through this region and remain undamaged by this possible UAV threat?” In 
other words, it is the probability of a casualty-free encounter. The probability on the map 
corresponds to the UAV attack taking place while the ship is at that point. Because of 
this, the risk corresponding to a path is the maximum risk along that path, unless the user 
has reason to believe the attack will not occur while they pass through that maximally 
dangerous zone. 
It is important to note that these values correspond to immediate engagement. The 
simulation models the ship as firing on the UAVs as soon as they cross over open water, 
where they are easier to detect. For other scenarios, see the next output view. 
3. Interpreting the Response Time View 
Once an engagement has begun the relative position of the UAVs and ship 
becomes more important than the absolute position of either. In this case, the application 
results can be displayed more simply as a threat level indicator versus distance from the 
ship as shown in Figure 62. Based on discussions with stakeholders, the authors chose to 
represent this threat level as the remaining decision time, that is, the amount of time in 
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seconds the ship can wait before firing on the UAVs and still maintain an acceptable 
probability of success, here defined to be 90 percent. 
 
Figure 62. UAV Threat Response Time View 
This chart is generated by calculating the distance that the probability of success 
equals the threshold value. Then the distance from this threshold range to the current 
UAV position is divided by the UAV speed to estimate the number of minutes available 
to the ship before an immediate response is necessary. This view can be shown for any 
one UAV launch site at a time. This view and the button to reveal it are shown in Figure 
62. 
4. Exporting the Results 
Though the development of the export features was outside the scope of this 
project, the interface is shown in Figure 63. These buttons would link the user to an 




Figure 63. Export Menu 
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
The following are some lessons learned by the authors to improve some areas of 
the system in future studies to improve or expand on this work. 
1. Up-to-Date Intelligence is Critical  
The stakeholders interviewed made it clear that the information driving the results 
needed to be up to date at all times. They suggested that updates to the model should be 
made and pushed through to the user interface often. Specifically, they indicated that 
there was value even in daily updates. 
2. Web Based is Possible 
Keeping the user interface so up to date would be a monumental challenge if not 
for the second revelation revealed by the stakeholders. According to those interviewed, 
they are confident that SIPRNET connectivity is robust enough that a tool like the one 
authors envision could be hosted online and accessed remotely. 
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This greatly simplifies the process of keeping the user interface up to date. It was 
this realization that motivated the shift from a desktop app to an emulation of a web-
based solution and the significant appearance changes that accompanied that shift. 
3. Concrete versus Abstract 
The trend from prototype to prototype shows clearly a shift from abstract displays 
of the results—the risk cube, generic contour plots, and chart output—to concrete ones –
the map. Though charts, tables, diagrams, and other abstract visualizations of data have 
their place, the users responded most strongly to the concrete and intuitive nature of the 
map view. The concept of a map has become the core of the user interface and the 
primary means of communicating the results.  
E. GUI COST 
The efforts described in this report resulted in a working prototype. To take this 
working prototype and create a full production system requires funding, staffing and 
technical system requirements. This section details the estimated cost to take the 
prototype as it exists and transform it into a production system that could be used fleet-
wide. The cost estimate was developed using the System Cost Model suite provided by 
NPS. The cost model suite was chosen as a tool for estimating cost of future system due 
to the authors familiarity with the cost model from the SE3011 Engineering Economics 
and Cost Estimating class at NPS. Raymond Madachy gave a lecture tittled “Constructive 
Cost Models” on January 30, 2014, at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. In his 
lecture, he introduced the Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) suite and the Constructive 
Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO) model. In addition, Raymond Madachy 
gave a lecture tittled “Software Engineering Cost Model” on February 6, 2014, at Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey. In this lecture, he introduced COCOMO model for 
software engineering.  
The output from the cost model contains relevant information that represents a 
decision factor for stakeholders. The cost model suite is an integrated tool that is used to 
perform cost estimates for various engineering disciplines including system engineering 
and software development. The COSYSMO is a tool within the System Cost Model Suite 
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that is used to estimate the system engineering costs of a project. Another tool in the suite 
is the COCOMO II, which estimates the costs of software development and sustainment. 
The authors have used these tools together to produce a comprehensive total ownership 
cost estimate for this project. 
The COSYSMO model estimates the size of the project using four size factors: 
system requirements, interfaces, algorithms and operational scenarios. In addition, the 
model uses 14 effort multipliers and the labor rate. Both COSYSMO and COCOMO II 
models incorporate maintenance cost required to sustain the system through its lifecycle. 
The COSYSMO model input data is shown in Table 5. The authors added up all of the 
detailed software requirements, shown in Chapter III, Section C, and found that there 
were a total of 55 software system requirements. There were 13 system interfaces 
determined by the number of boundaries that exist between system functions (internal 
interfaces) and the external system functions. The system has one use case, which is 
termed as the operational scenario.  
 
Table 5. COSYSMO Input (after Madachy 2014) 
System Size Number 
System Requirements 55 
System Interfaces 13 
Operational Scenarios 1 
System Cost Drivers (Effort Multiplier) Rating 
Requirement Understanding  Few undefined areas (high) 
Architecture Understanding Strong understanding of architecture and 
COTS, few unfamiliar areas (high) 
Level of Service Requirements High financial loss (high) 
Migration Complexity Everything is new; legacy system is 
completely replaced or nonexistent 
(nominal) 
Technology Risk Proven on pilot projects and ready to roll-
out for production jobs (nominal) 
Documentation Extensive documentation and review 
requirements relative to life cycle needs, 
multiple revisions required (very high) 
# and diversity of installations/platforms Moderate environmental constraints; 
controlled environment (high) 
# of recursive levels in the design Extremely complex interdependencies 
coordination, and tradeoff analysis (very 
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System Size Number 
high) 
Stakeholder team cohesion Shared project culture (nominal) 
Personnel/team capability Intellectual capability is System Engineers: 
90th percentile (very high) 
Personnel experience/continuity 3 years of continuous experience (nominal) 
Process capability Defined SE process, activities driven by 
benefit to project, SE focus is through 
operation, process approach driven by 
organizational processes tailored for the 
project (high) 
Multisite coordination Multi-city or multi-company, some time 
zone effects (nominal) 
Tool support Strong, mature SE tools, moderately 
integrated with other disciplines (high) 
Maintenance 
Annual change percent 5 
Maintenance duration  7 years 
Software Labor Rates (dollars) 15,000 
 
The effort multipliers for the cost model were rated based on the following 
assumptions: 
1. Requirements understanding – Stakeholders’ understands the users’ needs 
from a system perceptive and the constraints that the system will be 
developed and operated. 
2. Architecture understanding – The level of difficulty that will be 
encountered in developing and managing the system architecture with 
respect to “platforms, standards, components, connectors (protocols) and 
constraints” is minimal (Madachy 2014). 
3. Level of service requirements – The level of service requirement, such as 
interoperability and security, will cause high financial loss if not met. 
4. Migration complexity – The system will be integrated to an existing 
legacy system.  
5. Technology risk – The working prototype has been proven by stakeholders 
and will go into full production for fleet use.   
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6. Documentation – Detail documentation is required for the system’s 
lifecycle support. 
7. Number and diversity of installations/platforms – The system will be used 
on different platforms and will operate in a secured environment. 
8. Number of recursive levels in the design – System Engineering effort will 
be well coordinated and trade off analysis will be performed where 
necessary.  
9. Stakeholder team cohesion – The program team shares a common 
objective and has strong team support. 
10. Personnel/team capability – The program team has the skills and 
experience needed to start and complete the overall project.  
11. Personnel experience/continuity – The program team has a minimum of 
three years continuous working experience.  
12. Process capability – The program team has well documented and managed 
system engineering management plan. 
13. Multisite coordination – Not all stakeholders are co-located. Some 
meetings are conducted via phone and visual interactive collaboration. 
14. Tool support – Team has all necessary tools required to perform their job 
effectively and efficiently.  
Also, the COCOMO II model has one size factor, which is either thousands of 
software lines of code (KSLOC) or function points, which it uses to estimate project size. 
The model uses five scale drivers and seventeen effort multipliers. Two estimates were 
developed for the software development portion of the cost estimate that is, software 
development cost for the GUI and ExtendSim. The COCOMO II input data is shown in 
Table 6. The software lines of code were obtained from the GUI. In addition, 300 
function points was also obtained from the ExtendSim model. 
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Table 6. COCOMO II Input (after Madachy 2014) 
Software Size Number 
New (SLOC) 1000 
Reused (SLOC) 5000 
Function Points  300 
Language C  
Software Scale Drivers  Rating 
Precedentedness largely un-precedented (low) 
Development Flexibility general conformity (High) 
Architecture / Risk Resolution generally 75 percent (high) 
Team Cohesion highly cooperative (high) 
Process Maturity CMM Level 2 (nominal) 
Software Cost Drivers Rating 
PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES 
Required Software Reliability high financial loss  (high) 
Data Base Size (Database size/SLOC) 10 ≤D/P <100  (nominal) 
Product Complexity Use of simple graphic user interface (GUI) 
builders   (low) 
Developed for Reusability  across program  (high) 
Documentation Match to Life-Cycle 
Needs 
very excessive for lifecycle needs (very high) 
PLATFORM ATTRIBUTES 
Execution Time Constraint ≤ 70 percent use of available execution time 
(high) 
Main Storage Constraint ≤ 50 percent use of available storage (nominal) 
Platform Volatility Major change: every 12 months. 
Minor: 1 month. (low) 
PERSONNEL ATTRIBUTES 
Analyst Capability 75th percentile (high) 
Programmer Capability 75th percentile (high) 
Personnel Continuity 3 percent/year (very high) 
Applications Experience 6 years (very high) 
Platform Experience 3 years (high) 
Language and Tool Experience 6 years (very high) 
PROJECT ATTRIBUTES 
Use of Software Tools strong, mature lifecycle tools, moderately 
integrated (high) 
Multisite Development fully collocated (extra high) 
Required Development Schedule 100 percent (nominal) 
Maintenance 
Annual change size (ESLOC) 500 
Maintenance duration  7 years 
Unfamiliarity Mostly unfamiliar (0.8) 
Software Labor Rates (dollars) 13,475 
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The software scale and cost drivers were rated based on the following 
assumptions:  
1. Precedentedness – No similar software exists. It is an all new system; 
hence, precedentedness is rated low.  
2. Development Flexibility – Software design and demonstration must 
conform to specified requirements.  
3. Architecture/Risk Resolution – The program has well designed software 
architecture, risk reduction and mitigation plans.  
4. Team Cohesion – The program team shares a common objective and has 
strong team support. 
5. Process Maturity – Software processes are well design, managed and 
specific to the program. 
6. Required Software Reliability – Delay in software functionality will cause 
high financial loss to the program.  
7. Data Base Size – Data requirement will have minimal effect on software 
development.  
8. Product Complexity – The software designers will use simple GUI 
builders to enhance user interface.   
9. Developed for Reusability – The software is well documented and tested 
for possible other applications.  
10. Documentation Match to Life-Cycle Needs – Detail documentation is 
required for the software’s lifecycle support. 
11. Execution Time Constraint – Software will be developed per requirement 
to meet specific execution time with minimal time constraint. 
12. Main Storage Constraint – Minimal main storage constraint imposed on 
software system. 
13. Platform Volatility – The software platform “includes any compilers or 
assemblers supporting the development of the software system” (Madachy 
2014). The hardware will have a major change annually.  
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14. Personnel Capability/Continuity/Experience – The software team has the
skills and experience needed to start and complete the overall project.
15. Platform Experience – The software team has a minimum of three years
continuous working experience.
16. Language and Tool Experience – Team has six plus years of experience in
software programming and tool.
17. Use of Software Tools – Team has all necessary tools required to perform
their job effectively and efficiently.
18. Multisite Development – Not all stakeholders are co-located. Some
meetings are conducted via phone and visual interactive collaboration.
19. Required Development Schedule – The software developers have no
schedule constraint.
The cost estimate summary for the GUI is shown in Table 7. The total cost to 
build and maintain the GUI in the fleet is estimated at $1.74M. This estimate includes 
initial development and seven years of maintenance cost. Person-month is the measure of 
effort. System engineering effort requires 39 person-months; that is the amount of work 
done by 7.8 persons if they work full-time for five months. Similarly, software 
development effort requires 67 person-months; thus, 3.5 full-time persons are needed to 
work full time for 19 months. The maintenance duration for each effort is 84 months with 
two person-months for system engineering and one person-month for software 
engineering. This information was obtained from the System Cost Model Suite based the 
input data from Table 6 and 7. 
Table 7. Cost Summary 
Effort (Person-
month) Schedule (month) Cost ($) 
System Engineering 39 5 591,017 
Software Development 67 19 895,871 
Maintenance 3 168 257,684 
Total 1,744,572 
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F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The following are suggestions for future development of this project. The 
suggestions were based on user needs and stakeholders interactions. 
1. True Web App 
The authors’ suggest for future work the development of a truly web-based 
prototype. This would not only serve as a proof of possibility and an exploration of the 
available tools but as a means of reaching a greatly increased number of users for 
prototype testing. Also, by integrating this tool into a webpage, the COs would know that 
they are using the most effective and latest version of the tool. A desire for the version 
and date displayed was expressed; however, this need would be eliminated by putting this 
onto the Internet. The program office would be able to update this software frequently to 
support the fleet to the fullest extent. With frequent updates, the tool would be able to 
cover the constantly changing environment the U.S. Navy operates in. The webpage 
would be easily accessible since the majority of ships have SIPRNET capability via 
satellite.  
2. SIPRNET Reliability 
The unclassified nature of this effort prevents from extending the understanding 
of SIPRNET’s reliability beyond the anecdotes the authors received. Because of the 
critical dependence of this concept on classified connectivity, future work stands to 
benefit from an improved understanding of the robustness and limitations of that 
network. 
3. Nonkinetic Energy 
Nonkinetic energy weapons threaten and inflict damage through a method other 
than physical application to the body of a human, ship or aircraft. These methods include 
sound, radiation, and chemical agents among others. Many interviewees expressed the 
desire to utilize this method of warfare. These nonkinetic methods of fighting eliminate 
the firing of projectiles from the ship; rather they involve the firing of a widespread gas, 
sound, or wave of some sort. This would aid to increase the Pk by being able to fire in the 
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direction of the UAV rather than directly at it. The laser weapon system that is fielded on 
a single DDG currently has been tested on UAVs before. However, the testing results are 
classified and therefore out of scope for this report. The fleet will be gaining several other 
nonkinetic weapons within the next several years, which could potentially be tested to be 
used to defeat UAVs. While these capabilities are not currently within the scope of this 
project, with further testing that will likely be classified, the weapon systems that will be 
added to the ships in the future could be used as a weapon against UAVs and assimilated 
within the tool in the classified realm.  
4. Kill Radius 
The interviewees also discussed the desire to have a kill radius surrounding the 
ship. Not all UAVs would have to actually come into physical contact with a ship in 
order for it to cause damage. It was expressed that a visual representation of this radius 
that the UAV would have to come within to be counted as a kill would be extremely 
useful. This would alter the simulation as currently the kill ring is based on the size of the 
ship. By accounting for the type of UAV (one that could cause damage without contact) a 
new kill ring would need to be determined. This could be developed in the future as the 
types of enemy UAVs evolve.  
5. Identification of UAV Type 
A useful piece of information that would be necessary prior to engaging with the 
UAVs would be the classification of UAV. In the future, by incorporating a tab with an 
output of various known UAVs, the tool could print out a file that would include 
characteristics of the hostile UAVs. This tab would identify the threats presented by the 
particular attacking UAV. It would also include a picture of the UAV for reconnaissance. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND AREAS OF FURTHER STUDIES 
The following are the conclusions based on the research questions and 
stakeholders’ needs. The recommendations are geared towards future development 
studies of this topic. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this project was to examine the need for a UAV Swarm Risk 
Assessment Tool and create a UAV Swarm Operational Risk Assessment System GUI. 
The authors made use of human-centered design principles in conjunction with more 
traditional system engineering tools to explore the problem space, identify requirements, 
analyze functions, and design a solution for the problem. The final outcome was a 
working prototype that is responsive to the listed requirements and stakeholder needs. 
The GUI can assist the Navy’s decision makers in assessing risk of UAV swarm threats 
in littoral environments, near potentially hostile countries, based on the latest intelligence. 
The system concept consisted of several parts: a discrete-event simulation of 
UAV swarm attacks using ExtendSim, a statistical analysis of the simulation data 
analyzed using Minitab, and a graphical user interface (GUI) that evolved as a web-app 
prototype using MATLAB. Data from the simulation were analyzed and used to generate 
equations that calculate the effect of critical factors such as physical environment, 
number of UAVs, distance from land, and the ship’s defensive weapons. The GUI uses 
these equations to provide users with the capability to vary factors relevant to a UAV 
swarm attack and analyze different courses of action and risk. 
This project created a physical GUI web-app that can be used, tailored or 
expanded for future studies and updated with the latest intelligence. This web-app 
prototype can assist decision makers in assessing risk of UAV swarm threats in littoral 
environments, near potentially hostile countries. The GUI gives information critical to 
assess the risk of swarm attacks in littoral environments to analyze different course of 
action and risk. As the project progressed, the answers to the research questions were 
discovered and documented. 
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1. Research Questions 
This project was to provide commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, 
fleet commanders, operational planning teams or area of responsibility commanders with 
a way to better assess the risks presented to them by UAV swarm attacks. In order to 
design an appropriate system to assess risk, a variety of research questions were asked. 
a. What are the types, capabilities, and flight envelopes for unmanned 
aerial “attack” vehicles of hostile foreign countries? 
In order to answer the threat UAV types, capabilities, and flight envelopes, an 
analysis of UAV technologies available to hostile nations was conducted. As shown in 
Table 1 of the report, the flight envelopes of current day threat UAVs are drastically 
different from that of conventional air threats such as fighter jets and cruise missiles. 
Their relatively low speed (80 to 200 kts), operational ceilings (less than 15,000 ft MSL), 
operational ranges (27 to 270 nm), and low payloads (16 to 100 lbs) make them 
dramatically less capable than traditional air threats; however, these differences also give 
them a distinct advantage in terms of how they are tracked, engaged, and ultimately 
defeated.  
The primary driver for performance of UAVs, as compared to manned aircraft, is 
their overall size. In general, they are much smaller than their manned counterparts, 
which is one of the primary drivers of their low costs. Aircrew life support systems and 
human machine interfaces are not required for UAVs. Specific design criterion such as 
survivability and reliability may also become less important without human aircrew in the 
airframe. This overall decrease in cost leads to the potential for more air threats attacking 
simultaneously.  
Modern air defense radar systems were designed for traditional air threats that are 
larger and fly much faster. Since the likelihood of more UAVs attacking at one time is 
increased, the detection and identification of singular threat becomes much more 
difficult. As such, the timelines for battle commanders to decide “who” to engage, “how” 
to engage, and “when” to engage are also impacted. Ultimately, hostile countries can use 
the characteristics of “less” capable UAVs to their advantage. The drastic differences 
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between UAVs and traditional air threats are ultimately what make UAVs a new and 
formidable threat to surface ships. 
b. What tangible information, systems, and interactions are needed by 
surface ship commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet 
commanders, operational planning teams or area of responsibility 
commanders to make a risk decision for an operation? 
Tangible information, systems, and interactions needed by surface ship 
commanding officers, carrier task force commanders, fleet commanders, operational 
planning teams or area of responsibility commanders to make a risk-based decision for an 
operation was determined using interviews of stakeholders for user needs. Interviewees 
covered the full kill chain from CAPTs to LTs to gain a wide variety perspective tactical 
and strategic. The interview results were dissected into user needs and placed into affinity 
diagrams. These affinities organized user needs for model input, model output, 
tool/application, user interface, blue force capabilities, and rules of engagement. 
A major factor was UAV detection. Stakeholders addressed issues with how the 
littoral environment has impacted the capability to detect and track. The environmental 
factors included time of day, visibility, sea state, weather and clutter. These factors, along 
with the availability and readiness of the CIWS, five-inch gun, and MGS scope the 
engagement context to evaluate a risk-based decision for an operation. 
The other aspect of concern to the stakeholders was the type, number and location 
of UAVs. This directly relates to the time for a CO to react to detection. Stakeholders are 
uncomfortable with attacking a UAV until they identify it. Hostile intent or act is even 
more difficult to identify. The CO wants to know how much time he has to engage before 
he is vulnerable.  
c. What are the standard and nonstandard navy tactics for UAV swarm 
attack? 
The standard and nonstandard navy tactics for UAV swarm attack were examined 
based on ships operating in a littoral environment. A constrained environment such as a 
straits transit presents several challenges. Challenges include restricted maneuvering, a 
potential for high air and surface traffic to include civilian, commercial and military all 
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within close proximity of each other. The Law of the Sea dictates that warships and 
military aircraft: 
…must avoid “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the State bordering the strait,”… 
(Alexander 1991, 92) 
Identifying a hostile act with a UAV proves much more difficult than the 
identification of a manned aircraft. A UAV may be observing or capturing data of the 
ship at a distance and not actually engaging. The tactics for a surface ship against a 
swarm of UAVs is typically to maneuver out of the swarm environment. Surface ships 
are hesitant to engage UAVs with weapons systems.  
d. What are the gaps in technology and processes for UAV swarm response 
and what are the current work-arounds being used by the fleet? 
Gaps in technology and processes for UAV swarm were also examined. It is easy 
to conclude that there is very little technology out there that addresses the problems 
described in this project. The available references covering the current capabilities 
relevant to the project fell into two categories: UAV swarm attack simulations and 
operational planning user tools. There are UAV swarm attack simulations but the results 
have not been implemented into any other technology. Operational planning tools were 
discovered but none were UAV centric or addressed the problem this project is trying to 
solve. 
2. Requirements 
User needs were used to determine the requirements. One of the major needs 
revolved around the visual representation of hostile threat geographically. Inputs such as 
type, number, and location of UAVs are needed along with types of ships/combinations 
of ships in order to produce a unique risk output to their situation. Time to react gave the 
ship the ability to maneuver instead of engage. If the ship were to engage, this tool would 
also inform the amount of time the ship had to counter the attack. 
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3. Simulation and GUI 
The production of an ExtendSim based discrete-event simulation of the UAV 
swarm engagement allowed the authors to explore the trade-space and identify those 
input factors that have the greatest effect on the scenario outcome. The analysis shows 
that the most significant factors are: the number of UAVs in the swarm, the distance from 
the ship to the shore, and the speed of the UAVs. Besides those three factors, there are 
two other factors with less significance but that still pass the statistical test for 
significance. These factors are the prevailing meteorological visibility (which affects the 
range that the Mk15 MGS can be employed) and the number of Mk38 CIWS systems. 
The other six factors consider in this study, as part of the initial set of simulation runs 
discussed in Chapter IV Section D, did not significantly affect the simulation outcome 
and were changed to fixed values for the final runs of the simulation. This factor 
screening reduced the original eleven factors down to just four controllable factors and 
one categorical factor (Number of CIWS). This allowed keeping the total number of runs 
down to a manageable level.  
Using Minitab, a regression was used to generate a response equation to represent 
the simulation output. This response equation drives the MATLAB GUI enabling 
immediate responses to user inputs, without the need to wait for a new simulation run. 
Ultimately this methodology enabled the authors to create a prototype that was closer to 
realism than the authors would otherwise have been able to create without these tools. 
Of equal importance to the discrete-event simulation is the user interface 
developed to let users explore, interpret, and share the simulation results. A prototype 
GUI was developed in MATLAB, emulating a web-based application. This prototype 
followed several generations of iterative improvement starting with whiteboard drawings 
and guided through the iteration by stakeholder feedback. The final version is a refined 
and very capable web interface that was well received by the stakeholders. 
The GUI prototype is the result of many iterations of human-centered design 
reflecting the feedback of many potential users or user representatives. Stakeholder 
interest in responsive design, low wait times, integration into existing computer systems, 
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and assurance of up-to-date intelligence guided the authors to a web-based solution. The 
final GUI from this effort, though developed in MATLAB, was built to emulate a web 
application. 
The user interface is designed to be intuitive and exportable. The results are easy 
to produce, transport, and interpret because the user in front of the computer is often not 
the decision maker who needs the information based on feedback received. 
Guided by the feedback of the stakeholders, the interface presents the UAV threat 
information in two ways; details of the GUI are discussed in Chapter V. First is a map, 
displaying user-specified launch sites and a colored contour map of likelihood of a zero-
casualty encounter. (The simulation does not characterize the impact of a UAV hitting the 
ship and stakeholders indicated they would not trust a tool that did.) The second output is 
the inverse and is centered on the ship rather than the UAVs. It indicates the remaining 
reaction time available to the ship before they must open fire in order to have a 
reasonable probability of repelling all of the UAVs according to the simulation. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
Future groups who might carry this project to the next phase should plan to revisit 
the extensive set of assumptions and simplifications built into the ExtendSim simulation. 
These were necessary during this first attempt, in order to keep the effort unclassified and 
to remain within the constraints of schedule, computing power, and technical skills of the 
students; however, a higher fidelity modeling effort may yield insights into the nature of 
the UAV swarm engagement that could affect the GUI design or the general concept. 
A follow on effort should focus on contacting the NAVSEA AEGIS Integrated 
Combat System Threat Analysis Assistant Program Manager (APM) Program Executive 
Office (PEO) Integrated Weapons Systems (IWS) to investigate the potential for making 
this an official software acquisition project. PEO IWS may choose to have professional 
modelers and web developers create a high fidelity simulation based on classified 
intelligence analysis to produce true decision quality inputs for the GUI. They may also 
have web developers produce a web page or have the Aegis weapon system prime 
contractor provide a quote for integrating such a capability into the weapon system. The 
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follow on strategy could also research what organization would be most appropriate to 
conduct the analyses needed to periodically update the model inputs. 
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APPENDIX A. UAV SWARM SIMULATION DESIGN 
An overview of the discrete-event simulation was provided in Chapter IV. This 
appendix provides a detailed step-by-step description of the model. Using ExtendSim9, 
the simulation was laid out following the basic process flow architecture shown in Figure 
64. The first task upon initialization of the simulation is to read in the variables for each 
run from an input database. 
 
Figure 64. Model Read-In from Database 
Next the simulation must calculate several pieces of information before and 
during the run. Given the distance and applying a uniform random distribution for the 
azimuth angle, it assigns the X and Y coordinates of the starting position of the UAV 
swarm as depicted in Figure 65. 
 
Figure 65. Setting the UAV Start Position 
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The sea state, Figure 66, is randomly set to integers 1, 2, 3, or 4 matching the 
standard maritime sea state definitions, and then converted to a degradation value used 
later in the Probability of Kill determination. 
 
Figure 66. Calculating Sea State 
The visibility distance, Figure 67, is set based on a uniform random distribution 
returning values between 20 miles and 0.2 miles. 
 
Figure 67. Setting Visibility 
As the simulation runs, at each time step the new ship’s position is based on the 
ship’s speed, Figure 68, and starting location of (0,0). The ship moves along the X axis 
while the UAVs move in both X and Y in order to intercept the ship. 
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Figure 68. Calculating the Ships Position 
The simulation then reads the number of UAVs, Figure 69, to be created each run 
and creates them with a slight random time delay between UAVs to simulate the fact that 
are probably not all launched at exactly the same time. The queue block that follows the 
create block is provided to ensure stability of the simulation and does not affect the 
outcome. 
 
Figure 69. Creating UAVs 
Next the attributes, Figure 70, of starting position and speed are assigned to the 
UAVs as they pass through the Set Attributes block.  
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Figure 70. Setting UAV Attributes 
Ship motion, Figure 71, is restricted to the X-axis, while the UAV can move in 
both the X- and Y- axes. The logic behind it is similar to that of a homing missile. Every 
time the ship moves the UAV must change direction in order to track toward the ship and 
intercept it. This makes the UAV’s motion dependent on the ship’s position. The math 
behind this “homing” behavior is performed in the motion generator equation block.  
 
Figure 71. UAV Motion Generator 
After the motion and distance have been determined, the simulation must decide 
when the UAVs are detected by the ship. Figure 72 shows the blocks that calculate the 
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range and use the Probability of Detection to determine at what point the UAVs have 
been detected. 
 
Figure 72. UAV Detection 
Once the UAVs are detected, they can be engaged by the ship’s weapon systems. 
This next set of blocks in Figure 73, handles the weapons engagement, determining if 
each shot attempt kills or misses the UAV. Each weapon system has its own unique PK 
based on range, sea state and visibility. The closest UAV always has the priority for 
engagement. The appropriate weapon is selected is based on each UAVs distance to the 
ship. The equation block on the lower left of Figure 73 determines the maximum 
effective range of those weapons that are limited by visibility and also adjusts the Pk 
based on sea state. The three random number generators, one for each weapon system, 
randomly generate a number, between zero and one, for each shot attempt. If the 
randomly generated number is less than the Pk for that weapon system, then the UAV is 
hit and destroyed; otherwise, it is a miss. This comparison is done in the equation block 
on the upper right of Figure 73, and the appropriate signal is sent to the sorting block on 
the left side of Figure 74, to route the UAV through the model based on its status. While 
the engagement unfolds, the remaining UAVs continue to close with the ship, so range is 
constantly decreasing. Sea state and visibility remain constant within each run.  
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Figure 73. Weapon System Engagement 
Based on the outcome of the equation block on the right side of Figure 73, each 
UAV is determined to have reached the ship, or to still be flying, or to have been 
destroyed by one of the three weapon systems. That equation block controls the sorting of 
through the “select out” box on the left side of the Figure 74. UAVs that are still flying 
and have not reached the ship yet are routed back through the engagement blocks in 
Figure 73. If a UAV reaches the ship, Figure 74, it is routed to the end block labeled 
“Ship Kill” and the simulation run ends. If the UAV is shot down, it is routed to the end 
block corresponding to the weapon system that shot it down. 
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Figure 74. UAV Disposition 
This equation block, shown in Figure 75, ends the current run when the number of 
UAVs created is less than or equal to the sum of the UAVs shot down by the three 
weapon systems. It will also stop the run when any UAV makes it to the ship. 
 
Figure 75. Simulation Stop Logic 
The final step in each run is to write the engagement statistics to an ExtendSim 
database, Figure 76. This database was exported to Minitab for post-simulation analysis. 
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Figure 76. Writing the Output to a Database 
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APPENDIX B. MATLAB SCRIPT 
The final prototype application is run from a MATLAB function called 
uav_threat_application.m. The contents of this function are copied below. 
 
function uav_threat_application 
% variable parameters 
groundcolor = [0.9,0.85,0.5]; 
  
fig = gcf; 
set(fig,'Visible','off') 
clf 







% Set random seed for repeatability 
R = RandStream.create('mrg32k3a','Seed',134);%'shuffle'); % was 134 
F = designfilt('lowpassiir', 'FilterOrder', 4, ... 
    'PassbandFrequency', 15e3, 'PassbandRipple', 0.2,... 
    'SampleRate', 200e3); 
  
% Define coastline 
N = 1e3; 
x = 0:N; 
y = N - 150*x/N - 300*(x/N-1/2).^2; 
y = y + filtfilt(F,cumsum(randn(R,size(x)))); 
  
% Hard code the X axis limits 
xl = [410,590]; 
% Then calculate sensible y limits (used to be yl = [864,948];) 
yl = y(x>xl(1)&x<=xl(2)); 
set(ax,'Units','pixels'); 
apos = get(ax,'Position'); 




% init with dummy then empty it 
threat(1) = addThreat(0,0); threat(1) = []; 
% add some real launch sites for the demo 
threat(end+1) = addThreat(513,917); 
threat(end+1) = addThreat(450,940); 
threat(end+1) = addThreat(570,915); 
uavCallback(threat(1).button) 
  
% Define image vars for threat plotting 
sqrtpixelcount = 1e3; 
x0 = linspace(xl(1),xl(2),sqrtpixelcount); 
y0 = linspace(yl(1),yl(2),sqrtpixelcount); 
[X,Y] = meshgrid(x0,y0); 
% Calculate color index from distance to threats using 
% alpha mapping to indicate land vs. water 
land = Y >= interp1(x,y,X); 
threatmap = imagesc(x0([1,end]),y0([1,end]),inf(size(X)),'AlphaData',~land+0.15); 
hold on 
[~,threatlines] = contour(X,Y,X,0:10:100,'ShowText','on','LineColor','k'); 
hold off 
  
% Tweak axes settings 
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set(ax,'Color',groundcolor,'Units','normalized','Position',[0,0,1,1],... 




cmap = flipud(colormap('parula')); 
colormap(cmap) 
% Setup colorbar with background for clarity 
patch(xl(2)-diff(xl)/24*[0,1,1,0],yl(1)+diff(yl)*[0,0,1,1],[0,0,0],... 
    'EdgeColor','none','FaceAlpha',0.3) 
hc = colorbar(ax,'east'); 
set(hc,'Color',[1,1,1]) 
  
% Create a patch for the Ship inputs/info tab 
tabs(1) = createTab('Ship Inputs',1); 
% tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','text','String','test',... 
%     'Position',[30,600,170,20]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.94,... 
    'Select your ship:','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
ships = {'DDG 01','DDG 02'}; 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','popupmenu','String',ships,... 
    'Position',[30,570,170,20]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.84,... 
    'Number of CIWS:','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','popupmenu','String',{'1','2'},... 
    'Position',[30,504,170,20],'Callback',@updateThreatMap); 
numCiws = @() get(tabs(end).children(end),'Value'); 
% Create a patch for the UAV inputs/info tab 
tabs(end+1) = createTab('UAV Inputs',tabs(end).bottom); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.94,... 
    'Select UAV:','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
uavs = {'Harpy','Custom'}; 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','popupmenu','String',uavs,... 
    'Position',[30,570,170,20]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.84,... 
    'Number of UAVs:','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','edit','String',1,... 
    'Position',[30,504,170,20],'Callback',@updateThreat,'UserData','num'); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.74,... 
    'UAV Speed: (200 knots)','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','slider',... 
    'Position',[30,438,170,20],'Min',50,'Max',300,'Value',200,'UserData','speed',... 
    'Callback',{@setLabel,tabs(end).children(end),'UAV Speed: (%.0f 
knots)',@updateThreat}); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','pushbutton',... 
    'Position',[40,60,150,30],'String','Switch Views',... 
    'Callback',@switchViews); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.10,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.072,... 
    '+','FontSize',36,'Color',[1,1,1],'ButtonDownFcn',@newThreat); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.05,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.072,... 
    '-','FontSize',36,'Color',[1,1,1],'ButtonDownFcn',@rmvThreat); 
% Create an Environment tab 
tabs(end+1) = createTab('Environment',tabs(end).bottom); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.94,... 
    'Visibility: (75%)','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','slider',... 
    'Position',[30,570,170,20],'Min',20,'Max',100,'Value',75,... 
    'Callback',{@setLabel,tabs(end).children(end),'Visibility: (%.0f%%)'}); 
visibility = @() get(tabs(end).children(end),'Value'); 
% Create the Notes tab 
tabs(end+1) = createTab('Notes',tabs(end).bottom); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','edit','String','Add your notes 
here...',... 
    'Position',[30,30,170,600],'Max',2,'HorizontalAlignment','left'); 
% Create the Export tab 
tabs(end+1) = createTab('Export',tabs(end).bottom); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = text(xl(1)+diff(xl)*0.027,yl(1)+diff(yl)*0.94,... 
    'Download report as:','FontSize',14,'Color',[1,1,1]); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','pushbutton',... 
 123 
    'Position',[40,550,150,30],'String','PDF'); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','pushbutton',... 
    'Position',[40,510,150,30],'String','Microsoft Word'); 
tabs(end).children(end+1) = uicontrol('Style','pushbutton',... 
    'Position',[40,470,150,30],'String','Microsoft PowerPoint'); 
  
% Minimize all but one tab 
switchTabs(tabs(end).text) 
% Minimize last tab 
% switchTabs(tabs(end).text) 
  
% Show the user! 




% the DeleteFcn of the uicontrol will take care of the rest 
delete(threat(end).button) 
  
    function [Z,levels] = genThreatMap 
        Z = inf(sqrtpixelcount,sqrtpixelcount,max(1,length(threat))); 
        vis  = 1 - visibility()/100; % read it once only to save time 
        if strcmp(get(threat(1).button,'Visible'),'on') % map view 
            for iii = 1:length(threat) 
                dist = sqrt((X-threat(iii).x).^2+(Y-threat(iii).y).^2); 
                if numCiws() == 1 
                    Z(:,:,iii) = 0.0585 + 0.01707*threat(iii).num + 0.06161*dist... 
                        - 0.00108*threat(iii).speed - 0.5414*vis -
0.000839*threat(iii).num*dist... 
                        -0.000053*threat(iii).num*threat(iii).speed - 
0.01080*threat(iii).num*vis... 
                        - 0.000149*dist*threat(iii).speed - 0.00312*dist*vis - 
0.000958*threat(iii).speed*vis; 
                else % numCiws() == 2 
                    Z(:,:,iii) = 0.2561 + 0.0177*threat(iii).num + 0.06419*dist... 
                        - 0.000431*threat(iii).speed - 0.5675*vis -
0.000839*threat(iii).num*dist... 
                        -0.000053*threat(iii).num*threat(iii).speed - 
0.01080*threat(iii).num*vis... 
                        - 0.000149*dist*threat(iii).speed - 0.00312*dist*vis - 
0.000958*threat(iii).speed*vis; 
                end 
            end 
            % Z = 100*min(Z,[],3); % treat each attack independently 
            Z = 100*prod(Z,3); % treat all attacks jointly (but not overlapping) 
        else % ship centered view 
            iii = find([threat.active],1); 
            dist = sqrt((X-xl(1)-diff(xl)/2).^2+(Y-yl(1)).^2); 
            desiredSuccessRate = 0.90; 
            levels = 10:10:100; % distances at which to plot time remaining (in minutes) 
            if numCiws() == 1 
                Z = (0.585 + 0.01707*threat(iii).num... 
                    - 0.00108*threat(iii).speed - 0.5414*vis... 
                    - 0.000053*threat(iii).num*threat(iii).speed... 
                    - 0.01080*threat(iii).num*vis... 
                    - 0.000958*threat(iii).speed*vis - desiredSuccessRate)... 
                    ./... 
                    (0.06161 - 0.000839*threat(iii).num... 
                    - 0.000149*threat(iii).speed - 0.00312*vis); 
                levels = (levels + Z)./(threat(iii).speed)*60; 
                Z = (dist + Z)./(threat(iii).speed)*60; 
            else % numCiws() == 2 
                Z = (0.2561 + 0.0177*threat(iii).num... 
                    - 0.000431*threat(iii).speed - 0.5675*vis... 
                    - 0.000053*threat(iii).num*threat(iii).speed... 
                    - 0.01080*threat(iii).num*vis... 
                    - 0.000958*threat(iii).speed*vis - desiredSuccessRate)... 
                    ./... 
                    (0.06419 - 0.000839*threat(iii).num... 
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                    - 0.000149*threat(iii).speed - 0.00312*vis); 
                levels = (levels + Z)./(threat(iii).speed)*60; 
                Z = (dist + Z)./(threat(iii).speed)*60; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
  
    function threat = addThreat(x,y) 
        threat.x = x; 
        threat.y = y; 
        wx = 1/30; % button width 
        ux = (x-xl(1))/diff(xl) - wx/2; 
        wy = diff(xl)/diff(yl)/30; 
        uy = (y-yl(1))/diff(yl) - wy/2; 
        png = which('uav_icon.png'); 
        str = ['<html><img src="file:',png,'" width="40" height="40"/></html>']; 
        threat.button = uicontrol('Style','pushbutton','Parent',fig,... 
            
'Units','normalized','Position',[ux,uy,wx,wy],'BackgroundColor',groundcolor,... 
            'Callback',@uavCallback,'String',str,... 
            'DeleteFcn',{@updateThreatMap}); 
        threat.num = 1; 
        threat.speed = 200; 
        threat.active = false; 
    end 
  
    function tab = createTab(name,top) 
        tab.name = name; 
        tab.pos = [xl(1) diff(xl)/6 yl(1) diff(yl)]; 
        tab.patch = patch(tab.pos(1)+tab.pos(2)*[0,1,1,1.1,1.1,1,1,0],... 
            tab.pos(3)+tab.pos(4)*[0,0,0.1,0.11,0.89,0.9,1,1],[0,0,0],... 
            'EdgeColor','none','FaceAlpha',0.3); 
        tab.text = text(tab.pos(1)+1.035*tab.pos(2),... 
            tab.pos(3)+(top-0.02)*tab.pos(4),name,'FontSize',18,... 
            'Color',[1,1,1],'Rotation',270,... 
            'HorizontalAlignment','left',... 
            'VerticalAlignment','middle',... 
            'ButtonDownFcn',{@switchTabs}); 
        % Reposition the tab patch to match the text 
        ext = get(tab.text,'Extent'); 
        y1 = (ext(2)       -tab.pos(3))/tab.pos(4) - 0.01; 
        y2 = (ext(2)+ext(4)-tab.pos(3))/tab.pos(4) + 0.01; 
        ydata = tab.pos(3)+tab.pos(4)*[0,0,y1-0.01,y1,y2,y2+0.01,1,1]; 
        set(tab.patch,'YData',ydata) 
        tab.top = top; 
        tab.bottom = y1-0.01; 
        tab.children = []; % to be filled later 
    end 
  
    function switchTabs(caller,~) 
        this = [tabs.text]==caller; 
        xpos = cellfun(@(c)c(1),get([tabs.text],'Position')); 
        [~,ismax] = max(xpos); 
        if any(diff(xpos)) % max was greater and not equal to the others 
            this(ismax) = false; % always minimize active tab 
        end 
        n = 15; 
        for iii = 1:n 
            nudgeTab(tabs(this),  1/n) 
            nudgeTab(tabs(~this),-1/n) 
        end 
    end 
  
    function nudgeTab(tabs,step0) 
        w = get(fig,'Position'); 
        w = w(3); % figure width for use below 
        % a step of 1 is the full tab width 
        for iii = 1:length(tabs) 
            tab = tabs(iii); 
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            xdata = get(tab.patch,'XData'); 
            tpos = get(tab.text,'Position'); 
            step = step0*diff(xdata(1:2)); 
            if xdata(1)+step>xl(1) || xdata(2)+step<xl(1) 
                continue % refuse to detach tab from left edge 
            end 
            set(tab.patch,'XData',xdata+step) 
            tpos(1) = tpos(1)+step; 
            set(tab.text,'Position',tpos) 
            for iiii=1:length(tab.children) 
                nudgeChild(tab.children(iiii),step,w) 
            end 
        end 
        textOnTop 
        drawnow 
    end 
  
    function nudgeChild(h,step,w) 
        switch get(h,'Type') 
            case 'uicontrol' 
                pos = get(h,'Position'); 
                pos(1) = pos(1)+step*w/diff(xl); 
                set(h,'Position',pos) 
            case 'text' 
                pos = get(h,'Position'); 
                pos(1) = pos(1) + step; 
                set(h,'Position',pos) 
            otherwise 
                disp(get(h,'Type')) 
        end 
    end 
  
    function textOnTop 
        h = get(ax,'Children'); 
        these = arrayfun(@(h)isa(h,'matlab.graphics.primitive.Text'),h); 
        h = [h(these);h(~these)]; 
        set(ax,'Children',h) 
    end 
  
    function updateThreatMap(caller,~) 
        if strcmp(get(fig,'Visible'),'on') && exist('threatmap','var') && 
ishandle(threatmap) 
            threat([threat.button]==caller) = []; 
            if strcmp(get(threat(1).button,'Visible'),'on'); % map view 
                Z = genThreatMap; 
                set(threatlines,'ZData',Z,'LevelList',10:10:100) 
            else 
                [Z,levels] = genThreatMap; 
                levels = [0,round(levels(levels>0)*100)/100]; 
                set(threatlines,'ZData',Z,'LevelList',levels) 
            end 
            set(threatmap,'CData',Z) 
        end 
    end 
  
    function setLabel(caller,~,label,format,varargin) 
        if ~isempty(varargin) 
            feval(varargin{1},caller,[]) 
        end 
        set(label,'String',sprintf(format,get(caller,'Value'))) 
        updateThreatMap(0) 
    end 
  
    function updateThreat(caller,~) 
        ii = find([threat.active],1); 
        if ~isempty(ii) 
            switch get(caller,'UserData'); 
                case 'num' 
                    threat(ii).num = nanmax(0,round(str2double(get(caller,'String')))); 
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                case 'speed' 
                    threat(ii).speed = get(caller,'Value'); 
            end 
        end 
        updateThreatMap(0) 
    end 
  
    function uavCallback(caller,~) 
        set([threat.button],'BackgroundColor',groundcolor) 
        set(caller,'BackgroundColor',[0.85,0.2,0.15]) 
        ii = find([threat.button]==caller,1); 
        [threat.active] = deal(false); 
        threat(ii).active = true; 
        h = findobj('UserData','num'); 
        if isempty(h) % GUI not initialized yet 
            return 
        end 
        set(h,'String',num2str(threat(ii).num)) 
        recall(h) 
        h = findobj('UserData','speed'); 
        set(h,'Value',threat(ii).speed) 
        recall(h) 
    end 
  
    function recall(h) 
        f = get(h,'Callback'); 
        if iscell(f) 
            feval(f{1},h,[],f{2:end}) 
        else 
            feval(f,h) 
        end 
    end 
  
    function switchViews(~,~) 
        wasmapview = strcmp(get(threat(1).button,'Visible'),'on'); 
        if wasmapview 
            set([threat.button],'Visible','off') 
            set(threatmap,'AlphaData',ones(size(land))) 
            set(ax,'CLim',[0,30]) 
        else 
            set([threat.button],'Visible','on') 
            set(threatmap,'AlphaData',~land+0.15) 
            set(ax,'CLim',[0,100]) 
        end 
        updateThreatMap(0) 
    end 
  
    function rmvThreat(~,~) 
        delete(threat([threat.active]).button) 
        if ~isempty(threat) 
            threat(end).active = true; 
        end 
    end 
  
    function newThreat(~,~) 
        [gx,gy] = ginput(1); 
        threat(end+1) = addThreat(gx,gy); 
        updateThreatMap(0); 
    end 
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